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REFLECTIONS UPON LOUISIANA'S CHILD WITNESS
VIDEOTAPING STATUTE: UTILITY AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY IN THE WAKE OF STINCERI
Lucy S. McGough* and
Mark L. Hornsby**
I. INTRODUCTION
Senate Bill 136, ultimately enacted as Louisiana Revised Statutes
15:440.12 encountered little resistance through its legislative rite of pas-
sage.' As the committee minutes record its proponents' purpose:
[Blasically the bill provide[s] for a legal mechanism to protect
juveniles who ha[vel been physically or sexually abused from
the trauma of proceedings of criminal prosecution and related
proceedings. The bill provide[s] for a videotaping of the state-
ment of the child and it also provide[s] for a mechanism of
taking testimony of a child victim outside of the presence of a
jury .. . in the best interest of the child. 4
According to these minutes, it was also pointed out to the Senate
Committee that under then current procedure "the child actually had
to tell the story [of abuse by the defendant] many times, to grand juries
and others, and if this material was taped, the child need not repeat
the story."'
Like economic recovery legislation in the 1930's and "no-fault"
divorce statutes in the 1970's, child victim protection laws have swept
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Member of the class of 1988, Louisiana State University Law Center.
1. Kentucky v. Stincer, 55 U.S.L.W. 4901 (June 19, 1987).
2. 1984 La. Acts, No. 563, § 1.
3. Senate Bill No. 136 was reported out of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
to the legislature without dissenting vote. Minutes of the meeting of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Section C (May 15, 1984) (available at Legislative Research Library,
Louisiana State Capitol).
4. The minutes attribute these sentiments to Pete Adams, Executive Director of the
Louisiana District Attorneys Association. Id.
5. This statement is attributed by the minutes to John Mamoulides, District Attorney
for Jefferson Parish. Id.
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the country in the last three years, doubtlessly due to recent highly
sensationalized child sex abuse prosecutions in Illinois, Minnesota, and
California. 6 As the assemblyman-sponsor of the California measure,
similar to the Louisiana statute, noted in a press conference: "[Child
sexual abuse] is the issue of 1985... It's the anguish, the volume of
letters, the look in the eye. When an issue comes up like that, you add
a row of stars next to it.'7
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:440.1 is one of a pair of statutes
enacted in 19848 as a product of this reform movement; 9 this article,
however, will focus only upon the new authorization for the pre-trial
videotaping of a child witness's account. The expressed impetus for, this
statute, as the Louisiana legislative history indicates, is to minimize the
number of times a child victim has to recount the details of his or her
attack and to reduce what may be termed the "courtroom effect," the
added trauma which can occur when a child is shuttled in and out of
a series of public hearings. Such legislation actually can serve an equally
important goal of enhancing the reliability of a child victim's testimony;
however, this effect is less often mentioned in legislative debate or legal
literature. Failure to insure the testimonial trustworthiness of child wit-
nesses due to early bungling of the interviewing process may result in
the abandonment of prosecutions.' 0
6. For a description of these prosecutions, some of which never surface in the
appellate reports, see Moss, Are the Children Lying?, A.B.A. J. 58 (May 1987).
7. Girdner, Out of the Mouths of Babes, California Law. 57, 91 (June, 1985).
8. La. R.S. 15:283 (Supp. 1987). This statute permits a child to give simultaneous
testimony at trial in a room apart from the trial courtroom which is displayed on television
monitors. Unlike statutes enacted elsewhere, both defense counsel and the defendant may
also be present in the room from which the child is testifying, but "[the court shall
ensure that the child cannot see or hear the defendant unless such viewing or hearing is
requested for purposes of identification." La. R.S. 15:283 (B) (Supp. 1987). For further
discussion of this Louisiana statute, see Comment, Television Trials and Fundamental
Fairness: The Constitutionality of Louisiana's Child Shield Law, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 141
(1986) [hereinafter Tulane Comment].
9. Other states enacted much more extensive child protection legislative packages.
See, e.g., 1985 Fla. Laws Ch. 85-53, described in Hoffenberg & Skuthan, Protecting
Children in the Courts, 59 Fla. B.J. 14-33 (Oct. 1985). As the variety of trauma-reducing
measures has been popularly described:
In Massachusetts, judges bring in pint-size witness chairs so youngsters' feet
won't dangle. In Maryland, children who have trouble speaking may draw what
happened. In Minnesota, a child frozen with fear was permitted to testify from
under the prosecutor's table. And from Manhattan Beach, Calif., to Brooklyn,
N.Y., children in court use dolls to describe crimes whose names they don't
know. "We have to quit pretending that kids have to testify like adults," says
Kathleen Morris, a prosecutor in Minnesota. "If all they can do is show, that
should be enough."
Children and the Courts, 103 Newsweek 32 (May 14, 1984).
10. For a summary of these aborted prosecutions, see Moss, supra note 6, at 58-59.
CHILD WITNESS VIDEOTAPING1
This article will evaluate the effectiveness of Louisiana Revised Stat-
utes 15:440.1 in terms both of its reduction of testimonial trauma and
its enhancement of testimonial reliability.
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. The Traumatization of Child Witnesses
Many critics, including former Chief Justice Burger, have decried
the plight of victims during the lumbersome course of a criminal pros-
ecution, from the victim's first outcry to the police to his last answer
given on cross-examination at trial. While we are still willing to put
adult victims through such an obstacle course in the name of protecting
the accused's due process rights to full confrontation of his accuser,
there is little to justify the exaction of such human costs when the
victim is a child.
Though media coverage of child abuse trials in various parts of the
country has made everyone aware of the fact that children often now
appear as critical witnesses in prosecutions, the pretrial skirmishes in
California's McMartin case," more than any other investigation, exposed
the potential for child abuse at the hands of the legal system itself.
As one commentator described the pretrial ordeal of the McMartin
abuse victims:
The way the system worked, from the parent's point of view,
was shocking. One child spent one day being examined by the
prosecution and 17 days being cross-examined by the defense-
an exhausting and intimidating experience for an adult, but a
potentially shattering one to the child. But it is not only the
parent who can fall victim to the badgering [and attempt to
withdraw his child as a witness]-children as well have the fear
of spending days on the witness stand, and children begin to
understand what type of response can get them out of the
situation.' 2 According to [Dr. Roland] Summit, it is precisely
11. This case, popularly known as the "McMartin prosecution" after the director of
the preschool, Virginia McMartin, is reported as People v. Buckey, No. A-750900 (Cal.
Crim. Dist. Ct., 1984).
12. While not cited by this commentator, this phenomenon has long been recognized
by social scientists. "Motivated" forgetting is a theory which takes into account the
personal characteristics and situation of the subject which may affect not only his will-
ingness but also his ability to recall all or particular details of some experience. See
Hilgard, Remembering and Forgetting, Introduction to Psychology 294-97 (2d ed. 1957).
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such intense questioning by a skeptical adult that can trigger a
child to retract his story. 3
The pre-trial traumatization of a child carries other costs over and
above the tribute of fear and humiliation which a child victim and his
parents may pay as a result of his encounters in police stations, grand
jury sessions, and preliminary hearings. The victims of abuse may refuse
to continue with the accusation or be deterred from filing an initial
complaint in order to avoid the trauma of a prosecution, leaving the
accused abuser free from public scrutiny or restraint. As one expert
recently testified in a New Jersey case, dismissal of criminal charges is
the result in over 90%7o of child abuse cases in order to spare the child
the ordeal of trial. 14
More subtle than the societal costs of refusals to prosecute is the
potential that the child may mitigate the force of her accusation in order
to avoid continuing encounters with the accused adult abuser. It would
be the ultimate irony if our system's treatment of a witness, with its
demands of multiple appearances, narratives, and grilling at each suc-
cessive stage of a criminal proceeding, which was created to probe for
and insure the emergence of truth, in fact contributes to testimonial
unreliability. Yet a considerable body of social science data now supports
the conclusion that the current criminal justice system is counterprod-
uctive toward the goal of insuring the reliability of a child witness's
accusation.
B. Reliability Risks of Child Witnesses
The two principal reliability risks inherent in all testimony are mem-
ory-fade and pre-trial suggestibility. 5 The question then arises whether
a child witness is especially prone to memory-fade and concomitantly
more vulnerable to suggestibility than an adult witness.
After years of experiments, social scientists now agree that the
capacity to retain information, to "remember" it, increases with age
13. Rust, The Nightmare is Real, 14 Student Law. 3, 19 (April, 1986).
14. State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div..1984).
15. Existing social science data is only briefly described and cited in this article. A
more comprehensive analysis of the reliability problems inherent in children's testimony
is set out in McGough, For What It May Be Worth: Enhancing the Probative Value of
Children's Testimony (1987) (available through the authors of this article). The best single
published work to date is a special issue of the Journal of Social Issues which is wholly
devoted to the topic of the child witness. 40 J. Soc. Issues 1-175 (1984).
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until adulthood,1 6 although they disagree about why children are more
susceptible to memory-fade than adults. Some postulate that this deficit
is due to an incomplete maturation of critical portions of the brain;1 7
others reason that memory, like any other mental function, is a gradually
acquired skill. s Nevertheless, there is now substantial agreement within
the scientific community that children are able to retrieve less information
than adults when a significant period of time has passed before they
must recall it. Findings that children's "long term" memory is weaker
than adults' are enormously significant when coupled with the delays
inherent in most felony prosecutions. Some memory loss ordinarily occurs
after an interval of only one week in both adults and children, and
such losses are more acute in children. 9 While data testing children's
memory over the span of months or even years does not exist, it seems
plausible to project that lengthy delays before trial testimony is exacted
create a serious reliability risk in a child's ultimate in-court account.
If gradual loss of memory fragments were the only implication of
this long term memory research, then children's in-court testimony might
be considered at least minimally probative. However, where a strand of
memory is weakened over time it becomes more susceptible to twisting
or fragmentary substitution of new information from some source other
than the child's own memory.
Laboratory testing of the abstract susceptibility of children to sug-
gestion has been undertaken by several social scientists. Although the
16. "[l~n general, children have greater difficulty than adults in retrieving information
from long-term memory ... [T]here is quite a bit of evidence to suggest that they do."
Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40 J. Soc. Issues 51, 54 (1984).
For confirmation that memory-fade appears to be age-related, see also, Ornstein, Intro-
duction: The Study of Children's Memory, Memory Development in Children (Ornstein
ed. 1978); Brown, A.L., Theories of Memory and the Problem of Development: Activity,
Growth and Knowledge, Levels of Processing Memory 225 (Cermak & Craik, es. 1979);
and Perlmutter & Lange, A Developmental Analysis of Recall-Recognition Distinctions,
Memory Development in Children (Ornstein ed. 1978).
17. See, e.g., Perry & Teply, Interviewing, Counseling and In-Court Examination of
Children: Practical Approaches for Attorneys, 18 Creighton L. Rev. 1369, 1387 (1985).
18. Researchers also divide over whether the incipient missing skill is a lesser ability
to absorb what one sees when observing, a learning disability, or whether it is instead a
lack of sophisticated memory "retrieval" capacity. Compare, for example, Dempster,
Conditions Affecting Retention Test Performance: A Developmental Study, 37 J. Exper-
imental Child Psychology 65 (1984) with Chechile, Richman, Topinka & Eheresbeck, A
Developmental Study of the Storage and Retrieval of Information, 52 Child Development
251 (1981).
19. Cohen & Harnick, The Susceptibility of Child Witnesses to Suggestion, 4 Law
& Hum. Behav. 201 (1980) [hereinafter Cohen & Harnick]; Chance & Goldstein, Face
Recognition Memory: Implications for Children's Eyewitness Testimony, 40 J. Soc. Issues
69 (1984). However, it should be noted that research is still thin on the impact of lengthy
delays upon memory capacity of children. See Johnson & Foley, Differentiating Fact from
Fantasy: The Reliability of Children's Memory, 40 J. Soc. Issues 33, 36 (1984).
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results are mixed, all agree that resistance to suggestibility shows a
"developmental trend," that is, young children are most suggestible and
older adolescents are only slightly more likely to be misled than are
adults. In one widely publicized study, nine-year-olds showed an in-
creased inaccuracy rate of fifteen per cent (as compared to five per cent
for college-aged subjects) when misleading, suggestive questions were
asked. 20 As they concluded:
The data provide further evidence that memory may be com-
prised of information gleaned in the initial perception of events
coupled with suggestions supplied after the fact .... Further,
since this study has demonstrated that leading questions put by
an interrogator on one occasion can affect responses to questions
put by a different interrogator on a second occasion, this rec-
ommendation refers not only to courtroom interrogation but
also to precourtroom interrogation by, for example, the police.2 1
If children display an especial proneness to suggestibility in a lab-
oratory setting in which testing of observation is an expected occurrence
and questioning is conducted by an impartial examiner, surely they are
even more vulnerable to suggestion in a helter-skelter real world when
unexpectedly victimized by an adult. 22
What happens to the diminished resistance to suggestion when the
interviewer is a far from disinterested adult? Depending primarily upon
20. The following percentages express the degree of inaccuracy (acceptance of sug-
gestion) displayed by each age group. In each column, the first reported percentage is
the degree of inaccuracy resulting from tainted questions; the second percentage is the
degree of inaccuracy which resulted from untainted questions about recall. Two different
kinds of tests on separate groups of children and adults, reported below as "Test 1"
and "Test 2," were used to test their hypothesis.
9-year-olds 11 -year-olds College-Aged
Test 1: 75%, 60% 30%, 32% 20%, 15%
Test 2: 54%, 44% 69%, 65% 75%, 75%
Cohen & Harnick, supra note 19, at 207.
21. Cohen & Harnick, supra note 19, at 209 (emphasis added).
22. "Although there is a great deal of evidence of the young child's difficulty with
tasks focused on the goal of remembering in and for itself, there is little information on
whether the child has the means of remembering in situations where memory is subordinated
to a meaningful activity." Brown, The Development of Memory: Knowing, Knowing
About Knowing, and Knowing How to Know, 10 Advances in Child Dev. and Behav.
104, 116 (Reese ed. 1975). Not only are there distractions inherent in "everyday learning,"
but also stress can diminish an ability to recall harrowing encounters. This hypothesis
seem intuitively true, though it is unlikely that additional empirical data testing this
conclusion will or can occur. As Professor Melton has noted, laboratory experiments
testing children's memory have not involved "recall under stress or in situations of great
personal involvement." Among other obstacles, ethical constraints upon social science
research would preclude such experiments. Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5
Law and Hum. Behav. 73, 77 (1981).
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whether the abuser is a stranger or family member, pressure can be
levered upon the child to either inflate or suppress the details of his
memories of the abuse experience. In any felony prosecution for sexual
or physical abuse, a child victim will predictably encounter a series of
persuasive, authoritative interrogators, such as the child's concerned
parents, the police, prosecutors, or defense counsel who may be con-
sciously or unconsciously motivated to influence the child's memory of
the attack.
If young children suffer greater memory fade and tend to be more
suggestible, then lengthy delays before retrieval and recording a remem-
bered account at trial greatly increases the risk that such testimony will
be wholly or partially unreliable. The recording of a skillfully and
neutrally conducted early interview can reduce or perhaps avoid entirely
potential testimonial distortion resulting from memory fade or suggestive
pretrial discussions with the child. Wigmore's observation about adult
memory and the past-recollection-recorded exception to the hearsay rule
is even more telling regarding a recorded early statement of a child
witness:
A faithful memorandum is acceptable, not conditionally
but unconditionally; because, for every moment of time which
elapses between the act of recording and the occasion of tes-
tifying, the actual recollection must be inferior in vividness to
the recollection perpetuated in the record.23
As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, by providing
for the early preservation of a child victim's eyewitness account, which
can be used in pretrial proceedings in lieu of an actual appearance by
the child, Louisiana's statute not only alleviates the trauma of multiple
retellings of her abusive experience but also enhances the reliability of
her account.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE LOUISIANA STATUTE
Videotaping statutes can be broken down into two groups: those
that provide for the taping of testimony (a deposition procedure) 24 and
23. 3 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 738 at 76 (3d ed. 1940).
24. Alabama [Ala. Code § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1986)1; Alaska [Alaska Stat. § 12.45.047
(1986)]; Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4251-4253 (Supp. 1986)]; Arkansas [Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 43-2035 (Supp. 1985)1; California [Cal. Penal Code § 1346 (West Supp.
1987)]; Colorado [Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-413 (1986)]; Florida [Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.53-
.55 (West Supp. 1987)1; Hawaii [Haw. R. Evid. 616 (1985)]; Kansas [Kan. Stat. Ann. §
22-3434 (Supp. 1986)]; Kentucky [Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.350 (Baldwin 1986)]; Louisiana
[La. R.S. 15:440.1-.6 (West Supp. 1987)]; Main [Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1205
19871
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those that provide for the taping of un-crossexamined statements. 25 At
present more than twenty states provide for the taking of a child's
deposition. Of these states, at least six also allow the taping of a child's
statement. Only two states, Louisiana and Missouri,2 6 solely provide for
the taping of a child's statement.
The main features of Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:440.1 are: (1)
to authorize the videotaping of an interview with an abused child; (2)
to establish the requirements governing such an interview and its re-
cording; (3) to regulate the use of such a videotaped recording as evidence
in proceedings before a juvenile or criminal court; and (4) to impose
confidentiality restrictions upon access to this recorded account by the
child.
In essence, the Louisiana statute provides for videotaping of an out-
of-court account given by child victims of physical or sexual abuse. If
the videotape meets certain minimal requirements of evidentiary com-
petence and if the child and any interviewer are available for testimony
at trial, the videotaped recording is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule in either a criminal prosecution or a juvenile proceeding.
A. Authorization: Availability of Videotaping Procedures
1. Statutory Requirements
The legislatively declared purpose of this statute is to minimize
'additional intrusion into the lives of child victims," and it protects,
by offering an alternative to multiple personal pretrial appearances, all
children under the age of fourteen who are allegedly victims of direct,
(Supp. 1986)]; 'Minnesota [Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (3)-(4) (Supp. 1987)]; Montana
[Mont. Code Ann. § 46-15-401 to 15-403 (1985)]; Nevada [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.227
(1985)]; New Hampshire [N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 517-13-a (Supp. 1986)]; New Mexico
[N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-17 (1985)1; New York [N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.32 (McKinney
Supp. 1987)1; Oklahoma [Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 752-53 (Supp. 1987)]; Rhode Island [R.L
Gen. Laws § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1986)]; South Dakota [S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-
12-9 (Supp. 1987)]; Tennessee [Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1986)]; Texas [Tex.
Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987)]; Vermont [Vt. R. Evid. 807 (Supp.
1986)]; and Wisconsin [Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 967.04 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986)].
25. Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4251 to -4253 (Supp. 1986)]; Kansas [Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 22-3433 (Supp. 1986)]; Kentucky [Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.350 (Baldwin
1986)1; Minnesota [Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (Supp. 1987)]; Tennessee [Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 24-7-116 (Supp. 1986)]; and Texas [Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 38.071 (Vernon
Supp. 1987)].
26. La. R.S. 15:440.1 (Supp. 1987); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 492.304 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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personal assault. 27 Videotaping the child's account may be authorized
upon the court's own motion or upon the motion of the district attorney,
a parish welfare unit or agency, or the Department of Health and
Human Resources. 2 Apparently, the consent of the child and his legal
representative is a necessary precondition to a court's order for video-
taping.
29
2. Effectiveness in Protecting Child Victims
Videotaping statutes vary in defining the class of children who are
afforded protection. The Louisiana statute, following the typical tack
taken by other states,30 limits these special procedures to child victims
under the age of fourteen. In adopting such a "bright line" approach,
the statute encounters the usual policy trade-offs inherent in such a
choice: efficiency and certainty of applicability are achieved, but at the
expense of the arbitrary exclusion of some older children who might,
on a case-by-case determination, be in need of special protection. For
example, it is not hard to imagine that a retarded fifteen year old or
a fifteen year old victim of years of incestuous assault might be severely
traumatized by the prospect of giving multiple accounts of her sexual
exploitation by her parent in open court. Drawing a bright line at age
fourteen seems especially anomalous in view of the fact that a minor
under the age of eighteen may be adjudicated a child in need of care
27. The identical provisions of La. R.S. 15:440.4 (4) and 440.5 (3) (Supp. 1987)
require: "[t]hat the recording is accurate, has not been altered, and reflects what the
witness or victim said" (emphasis added). Properly viewed this is not an expansion of
the authorized use of videotaping procedures to child witnesses who are not direct victims
of assault. The use of the word "witness" in this context seems, instead, to require that
the recorded account also accurately reflect the questions or comments of any interviewers,
supervisors or other witnesses to the videotaping of the child's account.
28. A coroner investigating the abuse of a child may also proceed to obtain a videotape
of the child's report although it is not clear whether he must proceed by first obtaining
a court order.
29. La. R.S. 15:440.2(A)(1) (Supp. 1987) makes a videotaping permissible, not man-
datory: "A court . . . may . . . require that a statement . . . be recorded .. " Tucked
away in La. R.S. 15:440.4(A)(1) (Supp. 1987) is the requirement that "such electronic
recording was voluntarily made by the victim of the physical or sexual abuse." Since,
under Louisiana law, the parent or tutor makes all decisions concerning the health and
well-being of his child, by implication the consent of the adult caretaker and legal
representative is also required. La. Civ. Code art. 216.
30. Those states which specify an upper age-limit of procedural availability range
from a high of eighteen years, see, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.227 (1985) (where witness
is a victim of sexual abuse, otherwise under fourteen), to a low of twelve years, see,
e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 492.304 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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and subject to the protective jurisdiction of the Louisiana juvenile courts. 3
Nevertheless, the critical deficit of the Louisiana statute lies not so
much in the arbitrariness of its choice of age fourteen as in its lack of
an available procedure for older children who might demonstrate equiv-
alent emotional harm, given the circumstances of a particular case.
Uniform Rule 807 and some state statutes specify age limits but sig-
nificantly provide for exceptions upon a showing of special need.32
The Louisiana statute should be amended to permit videotaping for
older children who appear to be as vulnerable to trauma as those under
fourteen, who are within the statute's protection. Using the language
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, these special procedures could be
made available upon a finding by the trial court that "there is a
substantial likelihood that the minor will suffer severe emotional or
31. Article 13(9) of the Louisiana Code of Juvenile Procedure defines "child" as
a person who has not attained seventeen years of age....
(b) For the purpose of proceeding under R.S. 14.403 relative to abused and
neglected children and for the purpose of proceedings in which children are
alleged to be in need of care or supervision, the term "child" shall include
persons who have not attained eighteen years of age.
32. E.g., Nevada extends its general rule of coverage for those under fourteen if a
prospective witness is a victim of sexual abuse. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.227 (1985). The
most elaborate provisions are found in the Wisconsin statute, which provides that video-
taping is available when a child witness is twelve or younger, or under sixteen, if the
court finds that the ".interests of justice" warrant that his testimony be prerecorded. The
factors which may be considered by the court are: the child's chronological age, level of
development and capacity to comprehend the significance of the events and to verbalize
about them; the child's general physical and mental health; whether the events about
which the child is to testify constitute criminal or "antisocial" conduct against the child
or a person with whom the child has a close emotional relationship; if the conduct
constitutes a battery or a sexual assault, its duration and the extent of physical or emotional
injury thereby caused; the child's custodial situation and the attitude of other household
members to the events about which the child will testify and to the underlying proceeding;
the child's familial or emotional relationship to those involved in the underlying proceeding;
the child's behavior at or reaction to previous interviews concerning the events involved;
whether the child blames himself for the events involved or has ever been told by any
person not to disclose them; whether prior reports have been ignored; the child's subjective
belief as to the consequences; symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder or
other mental disorders, including guilt, etc.; the number of separate investigative, ad-
ministrative, and judicial proceedings at which the child's testimony will be required; the
mental or emotional strain associated with keeping the child's recollection of the events
witnessed fresh for the required period of time; finally, whether the videotaping would
reduce the mental or emotional strain of testifying and whether the deposition could be
used to reduce the number of times the child will be required to testify. Wisc. Stat. Ann.
§ 967.04 (7)(6) (West Supp. 1986).
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psychological harm if required to testify in open court."' 33 As the Com-
missioners' comments- note:
The rule requires that the court make an antecedent finding
... before an extrajudicial statement may be admitted or al-
ternative means of testifying employed. This standard is intended
to require more than a showing of mere distress on the part of
a child who is faced with the prospect of testifying. It is a strict
standard, which is imposed in recognition of the fact that live
testimony and cross-examination is the preferred mode of proof.
It is not contemplated that the court will necessarily receive
expert testimony concerning the minor's emotional state in mak-
ing this determination. The court is in an adequate position to
assess the surrounding circumstances and to form a judgment
concerning the likely effect of live testimony in open court on
the minor without expert assistance.
34
Currently most states confine videotaping procedures to criminal
prosecutions" although such a limitation seems to be an unwarranted
restriction of the concept of victimization. Perhaps the reason for this
restrictive approach is that the opportunity for and advantages of civil
applications have not been brought to the attention of legislatures. Media
"hype," most notably that concerning the McMartin criminal trial, has
overshadowed the potential for civil applications.
The Louisiana statute permits the recording of statements of children
who have been either sexually or physically abused and extends not only
to criminal prosecutions but to juvenile proceedings which involve such
33. Unif. R. Evid. 807(a)(i) (adopted Nov. 1986). For amplification of the factors
which might be considered, see the Alabama statute, Ala. Code § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1986),
and the Wisconsin statute summarized in supra note 32. Some states, such as Arkansas
[Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1985)], Nevada [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.227 (1985)],
and New Mexico [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-17 (1985)] simply require a finding of "good
cause shown" without further elaboration.
It should be noted that the uniform rule requires such a showing before the receipt of
an extrajudicial statement by any child, regardless of age. There are no presumptions of
trauma. Furthermore, such special showings of emotional or psychological harm are only
available to children under twelve.
34. Unif. R. Evid. 807 (adopted Nov. 1986) official comments (emphasis supplied).
35. Furthermore, at least nine states restrict the applicability of these special procedures
to sexual abuse prosecutions. See the statutes of Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Maine, Montana, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont set out in
supra note 24. Such a restriction reinforces the hypothesis that these legislatures were
responding in a myopic way to the notorious McMartin prosecution.
1987]
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abuse. 36 However, it is difficult to justify the restriction of these special
protections to only those children whose trauma stems from some actual
physical violation of their bodies. Any purported distinction between
battery vis-a-vis assault seems untenable. For example, is the trauma
experienced by a child threatened with mayhem any less than the trauma
of a child who has been struck or sexually fondled? Certainly the studies
of child victims would not support such a distinction." The key term,
"physically or sexually abused," is not defined in this statute; therefore,
arguably, the definition of abuse found in the child abuse reporting
law38 could be used to broaden the availability of these special video-
taping procedures.
Even so, if protection of traumatized children (and their insulation
from further courtroom trauma) is the policy fundament, then this statute
should protect not only children who are direct victims of personal
threats or actual harm but also those who are unwilling, unwitting
witnesses to acts of violence directed toward others. "Trauma" is an
elastic term, but is perhaps most succinctly defined as an individual's
exposure to "an overwhelming event that renders him or her helpless
in the face of intolerable danger, anxiety, and instinctual arousal." 3 9
An individualized determination of "traumatization" is necessary, but
36. At least five states, besides Louisiana, provide for a limited use of such procedures
in special types of civil cases: Arizona (child dependency and termination of parental
rights proceedings); Florida (civil cases arising out of sexual abuse or child abuse); Kentucky
(all proceedings); Minnesota (all proceedings); Missouri (any proceeding at which sexual
abuse is an issue); Tennessee (civil proceedings in which child sexual abuse is an issue).
For citations to these statutes, see supra notes 24 and 25.
37. Terr, The Child as a Witness, Child Psychiatry and the Law 207 (Schetky &
Benedek eds. 1980); Pynoos & Eth, The Child as Witness to Homicide, 40 J. Soc. Issues
87 (1984) [hereinafter Pynoos & Eth]; Barbieri & Berliner, The Testimony of the Child
Victim of Sexual Abuse, 40 J. Soc. Issues 125 (1984).
38. 1987 La. Acts 626, to be codified at La. R.S. 14:403(B)(3) (Supp. 1987), defines
"abuse" as "the infliction by a caretaker of physical or mental injury or the causing of
the deterioration of a child including but not limited to such means as sexual abuse,
sexual exploitation, or the exploitation or overwork of a child to such an extent that his
health or moral or emotional well-being is endangered."
Although "abuse" is nowhere defined in the Code of Juvenile Procedure, the key term
"child in need of care," the modern euphemism for abuse and neglect jurisdiction, clearly
encompasses a broad use of these related terms. Article 13(14)(a) defines "child in need
of care" as a child "[w]hose parent inflicts, attempts to inflict, or, as a result of inadequate
supervision, allows the infliction or attempted infliction of physical injury or sexual abuse
upon the child which seriously endangers the physical, mental, or emotional health of
the child." In the statute authorizing the termination of parental rights, "abused child"
is defined as "a child against whom has been inflicted physical or mental injury which
causes severe deterioration to the child, including a child who has been abused sexually
or a child who has been exploited or overworked to such an extent that his health, moral,
or emotional well-being is endangered." La. R.S. 13:1600(1) (1983).
39. Pynoos & Eth, supra note 37, at 90.
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psychiatrists agree that the term encompasses more than the experience
of a direct, personal attack. As one rather obvious example, two re-
searchers have reported that nearly four out of five of all children who
witnessed a parent's homicide suffered from Post-traumatic Stress Dis-
order.40 In its description of this diagnosis, the American Psychiatric
Association observes:
The stressor [traumatic event] producing this syndrome would
evoke significant symptoms of distress in most people, and is
generally outside the range of such common experiences as simple
bereavement, chronic illness, business losses, or marital conflict.
The trauma may be experienced alone (rape or assault) or in
the company of groups of people (military combat). Stressors
producing this disorder include natural disasters (floods, earth-
quakes), accidental man-made disasters (car accidents with se-
.rious physical injury, airplane crashes, large fires), or deliberate
man-made disasters (bombing, torture, death camps). Some stres-
sors frequently produce the disorder (e.g., torture) and others
produce it only occasionally (e.g., car accidents). Frequently there
is a concomitant physical component to the trauma which may
even involve direct damage to the central nervous system (e.g.,
malnutrition, head trauma). The disorder is apparently more
severe and longer lasting when the stressor is of human design. 4'
Rule 807 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence acknowledges the fact
that psychic trauma can be either a direct or indirect experience for a
child. Upon a demonstration of severe emotional or psychological harm
from testifying, its special videotaping option is available in either crim-
inal or civil proceedings involving sexual conduct or physical violence
directed at the child or another. 42 As the Comments make clear:
The breadth of this approach is premised on the recognition
that, if the court finds the prerequisite "substantial likelihood
of severe emotional or psychological harm," the same consid-
erations apply to child witnesses as to child victims and are
equally applicable in civil as in criminal proceedings.4 3
Rule 807 currently makes it optional for an adopting state to decide
whether the witnessed violence must be directed toward any "parent,
sibling or member of the familial household of the child" or may more
40. Id.
41. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders § 308.30 (3d ed. 1980).
42. Unif. R. Evid. 807 (adopted Nov. 1986).
43. Unif. R. Evid. 807 (adopted Nov. 1986) official comments.
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broadly be extended to any "other individual." '44 Again, the difficulty
of line-drawing would seem to call for the broadest possible potential
availability: a child who witnessed the bloody death of a playmate by
a speeding automobile is as or more traumatized by that experience as
he would be in witnessing the whipping of his sister or experiencing a
slap to his own face.
Finally, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:440.2 is unduly restrictive
insofar as it allows only certain public officials to move for a videotaping
order. All states with videotaping statutes permit the district attorney
or the prosecuting attorney to file such a motion or application.4 5 Some
states extend this right to any party to the action. 46 The broadest possible
extension of the right to seek a videotaping order is that contained in
Uniform Rule 807 which provides that a motion may be filed by a
party, the minor, or the court .4  If videotaping is viewed as a trauma-
reducing procedure rather than an evidence-gathering tool, then it is
difficult to justify any restriction upon the power of someone legitimately
concerned about the child's welfare, such as his parent, to seek to invoke
this protective process.
Under Louisiana's law, only the court, the district attorney, or the
local or state public welfare agency can move for a videotaping order.
As a result, if a parent were troubled by his child's future involvement
as a witness in the prosecution of a case, that parent would be forced
to convince either the district attorney or the welfare agency to seek
such an order. It seems horribly ironic, in view of the statute's purpose,
to refuse standing to the individual who is both legally responsible for
the child and most likely to be concerned about her child's well-being.
Whatever social good might be derived from having some state repre-
sentative "screen" parental requests for videotaping protection seems
overcome by the insensitivity and inefficiency of a process which requires
the child's parent or other representative to flounder through a bu-
reaucratic maze to find some official willing and ready in time to secure
the promised legislative protection. 8 It is difficult to envision that friv-
44. Unif. R. Evid. 807(a) (adopted Nov. 1986).
45. See, e.g., Alabama, California, and New York statutes, supra note 24.
46. See, e.g., Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin statutes, supra note 24.
47. Unif. R. of Evid. 807 (approved Nov., 1986). Although Florida's statute au-
thorizes only depositions of a child witness, it does provide the clearest elaboration of
individuals who ought to be accorded standing: the victim or witness; the victim's or
witness's attorney, parent, legal guardian, or guardian ad litem; a trial judge on his own
motion; any party in a civil proceeding; or in a criminal action, the prosecuting attorney,
the defendant, or the defendant's counsel. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.53 (West Supp. 1987).
48. "The bottom line for parents is that you have to think twice before you put
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olous or otherwise abusive motions would be filed by the parent, legal
custodian, guardian ad litem, or tutor of a child. Moreover, even if
such occurs, surely it is the business of the courts to review and resolve
such requests.
In sum, Louisiana's statute should be broadened to achieve the
protection it promises for children who become caught up in traumatic
experiences which they must recount in later litigation.
3. Promoting the Reliability of Children's Testimony
If our only concern about the testimony of child witnesses is to
insulate them from testimonial trauma, then quite properly, as is cur-
rently the case, videotaping procedure should be made permissive and
consensual. With the changes suggested in the immediately foregoing
section, a potentially traumatized child can be fully protected under the
Louisiana statute. However, if our concern also extends to the assurance
of testimonial reliability, then the statute should clearly indicate that
the court can compel a child to participate in the early recording pro-
cedure. Since a competent child may not refuse to honor a subpoena
or to testify, 49 there would appear to be no justification for his refusal
to give a pretrial videotaped statement or for his caretaker's refusal to
submit him to such a procedure. In phrasing the requirement that the
recording be "voluntarily made," 50 the legislature may have only intended
to imply that the child's recorded statement be "voluntary" in the
evidentiary sense, that is, free from any coercion or undue influence
which might induce false statements. If so, the authors submit that this
concern can be more clearly expressed as a requirement that the trial
court consider whether, at or before the time of the videotaping, there
is any evidence of coercion, inducement, or undue influence leading the
child to make a particular statement.
As has been discussed in Section II, social science data substantiates
the conclusion that over time a child's memory fades, critical details
may be lost, and original observations may become subject to distortion.
Given the notorious delays in the legal system and the heightened vul-
your kid in court. . . . Originally the parents came to police out of a sense of responsibility
and duty-not a sense of revenge. Then they found that the system did not operate the
way they thought it would." Rust, The Nightmare is Real, 14 Student Lawyer 12, 18
(April, 1986).
49. La. Code Civ. -P. arts. 1357, 1633; La. Code Crim. P. art. 737; La. Code Juv.
P. arts. 19, 20. The definition of "delinquent act" which subjects a child to the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court includes a "direct contempt of any court committed by a child."
La. Code Juv. P. art. 13(7).
50. La. R.S. 15:440.4(A)(1) (Supp. 1987).
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nerability of a child to memory-fade and adult suggestion, the rather
obvious solution is an early recording of the child's account of the
events which are the focus of litigation. If, as will be developed more
fully in the next two sections, reliable testimony can be achieved by an
early recorded interview of a child, and if, as the extant empirical data
suggests, testimonial reliability is in fact enhanced by such early pres-
ervation of the child's memory, then videotaping of a child's statements
should be required.
Legislation requiring the early videotaping of a child's account in
all disputes in which a child is a witness necessitates a much more
complex array of procedures than can be set out here. That expansion,
however, may be a step which the Louisiana legislature is unwilling to
make until it has more experience with the use of voluntary videotaping
procedures. In the interim the Louisiana statute ought to be amended
to include the defendant within the list of those authorized to seek
pretrial videotaping. Under the current law, the prosecution can move
to record a child's account of the accusation, but that right is.denied
the accused. In justification of this exclusion, the state may assert that
the purpose of the statute is to protect the child from harassment and
pretrial trauma and that the individual accused of harming a child is
unlikely to be properly motivated in seeking to videotape the child's
account. Note, however, that under the Louisiana statute, a movant for
a videotaping order does not control nor participate in the actual vi-
deotaping process. Thus, there is little likelihood for defense harassment.
Furthermore, in authorizing a videotape in lieu of the child's direct
testimony, the legislature must meet its due process burden by insuring
that the resulting recording is at least as reliable, if not more reliable,
than what would otherwise be testified to in open court." And if the
Louisiana statute even indirectly is intended to produce a more reliable
form of evidence, then the state cannot withhold access to such pro-
cedures from one whom it prosecutes. The interrelated commands of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments mean that a state may not by
arbitrary rules of evidence deny a defendant the right to prepare for
and present reliable testimony critical to his defense. 2
51. For 'a review' of the principal United States Supreme Court decisions which
illuminate the constitutional dimensions of evidentiary statutes, see Rock v. Arkansas, 55
U.S.L.W. 4925 (June 22, 1987).
52. In its most recent opinion on this issue, the Supreme Court held that the defend-
ant's constitutional rights were violated by a state's per se rule excluding all hypnotically
refreshed testimony on grounds of unreliability. The state's legitimate interest in barring
unreliable evidence is inadequate to prevent an accused from demonstrating in a particular
case that the use of such a procedure could result in his being able to give trustworthy
testimony in his defense. Rock v. Arkansas, 55 U.S.L.W. 4925 (June 22, 1987).
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At a minimum, we submit that the Louisiana statute ought to be
amended to permit a defendant in a criminal prosecution to seek the
videotaping of a child's statement by the neutral interviewing process
currently available. If, as we suggest, videotaping procedures are to be
extended to civil proceedings, then the Louisiana statute should authorize
their use by any party affected by the child's account, following the
lead of many other states and rule 807 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
Although enhanced reliability is not an express purpose of the Louisiana
statute, the glimmerings of legislative concern for testimonial reliability
can be discerned from the strictures which currently surround the taking




As enacted, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:440.4 and 15:440.5 are
not clearly differentiated functionally. Section 440.4 purports to govern
the "competency" of any videotaped recording, whereas 440.5 purports
to govern "admissibility." Re-sorting their collective requirements, there
are seven competency prerequisites:
(1) that the recording was "voluntarily made" by the child; 3
(2) that no relative of the child was present in the room where
the recording was made;14
(3) that no attorney for either party was present when the
statement was made;55
(4) that the resulting statements were not the product either of
interrogatories5 6 or questions "calculated to lead the child to
make a particular statement; '5 7
(5) that the recording is "both visual and oral and is recorded
on film or videotape or by other electronic means; ' 5 8
(6) that the recording is "accurate, has not been altered, and
reflects what the child said;"5 9 and
(7) the taking of the child's statement was "supervised by a
53. La. R.S. 15:440.4(A)(1) (Supp. 1987).
54. La. R.S. 15:440.4(A)(2) (Supp. 1987).
55. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(1) (Supp. 1987).
56. La. R.S. 15:440.4(3) (Supp. 1987).
57. La. R.S. 15:440.5(4) (Supp. 1987).
58. La. R.S. 15:440.5(2) (Supp. 1987).
59. La. R.S. 15:440.4(4), reiterated in 15:440.5(3) (Supp. 1987).
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physician, a board-certified social worker, a law enforcement
officer, a licensed psychologist, or an authorized representative
of the Department of Health and Human Resources." '60
2. Effectiveness in Protecting Child Victims
If this is truly a trauma-avoidance procedure, then one would write
a statute which would require the presence of some neutral monitor
during the interview, to insure that the child is not badgered, brow-
beaten, demeaned or otherwise traumatized during the trial-replacement
procedure. To this end, the requirement that the statements are "vol-
untarily made" by the child may be read as a safeguard against adult
coercion of a child to make a particular accusation or statement. So
too, these criteria appear to envision a non-adversarial interview process.
At least at this stage of the proceedings, the child is shielded from any
confrontation or cross-examination by either the defendant or his coun-
sel.
Arguably, the seventh requirement, which lists those who must su-
pervise the interview, seeks to insure the presence of a neutral monitor
of the process. If such was the legislative intent, the flaw in the current
scheme is the inclusion of "law enforcement officer" within the permitted
class. As has been amply critiqued elsewhere, 61 such a broad term would
permit the principal police investigator to supervise or conduct the child's
interview. 62 Furthermore, unlike the qualifications attached to the au-
60. La. R.S. 15:440.4(5) (Supp. 1987).
61. Tulane Comment, supra note 8, at 172-76.
62. We acknowledge the intuitive notion, albeit without much empirical proof, that
a police officer may not be a neutral, non-partisan agent during an investigation when
he engages in what the Supreme Court has on many occasions referred to as the "often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1984). Although less often expressed as a concern, it must be
conceded that similar, human frailties of overzealousness can also arise in actions in which
the Department of Health and Human Resources is or may become the "prosecuting
party," such as in cases of parental abuse and neglect in which a child in need of care
petition is filed in juvenile court. In juvenile court actions, a child welfare caseworker
plays a role quite similar to that of a police officer in criminal investigations. In an
abstract, absolute sense, it cannot be said that a caseworker who conducts or supervises
the child's interview is perfectly impartial since he may well be the primary investigator
and ultimately a principal witness if the action is presented in court. In an ideal world,
one might require that the court supervise every interview of a child witness or that every
interviewer be specially appointed on an ad hoc basis with no associations whatsoever
with any state agency having prosecutorial responsibility. See, e.g., the suggestions in
Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator, 17 New




thorization of other professionals within this class, there is no require-
ment whatsoever that the police officer need be specially-trained in the
techniques of interacting with a young child.
Although no legislative history exists to explain the anomalous blan-
ket inclusion of law enforcement personnel within the class of authorized
supervisors, perhaps this addition came from a concern for implemen-
tation in smaller, rural parishes in which board-certified social workers
or licensed psychologists are few and far between. However, every parish
has a local child protection unit of the Department of Health and
Human Resources and has access to juvenile justice personnel provided
by the Department of Public Safety & Corrections. In the rare instance
in which there is a specially trained juvenile specialist within a local
police force, he could be appointed to conduct such interviews pursuant
to the existing general catch-all provision as an "authorized representative
of the Department of Health and Human Resources. ' '63 Removing the
current authorization of law enforcement officers would serve the dual
purposes of minimizing the potential intimidation of the child and en-
hancing the reliability of any resulting statement.
3. Promoting the Reliability of Children's Testimony
In the main, the criteria for creating a competent videotaped re-
cording manifest a primary concern for the resulting reliability of this
evidence, although, again, such is not an explicit goal of this statute.
Oddly enough, however, there is no requirement in the Louisiana statute
that the child be placed under oath or otherwise instructed about the
importance of a truthful account before giving his statement. Although
an oath is not ordinarily necessary for the admissibility of hearsay
statements, here the process envisions the production of a piece of
documentary evidence which can be used in court. A strong argument
can be made that the creation of what may become a substitute for at
least direct examination should be accompanied by an explanation and
administration of an oath.64
More important than the ritual of an oath taking is an explanation
of the function of such a process. The purpose of the oath is to provide
a symbolic reminder of the seriousness of the process and of society's
expectation of a truthful account. 65 The interviewer should explicitly
63. La. R.S. 15:440.4(5) (Supp. 1987).
64. Among other gains, the resulting videotaped statement could then clearly meet
the requirements for a witness's "appearance" before a grand jury. See infra note 80
and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 482 (1939);
Perry & Teply, supra note 17.
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emphasize to the child that if he is uncertain or cannot remember the
facts necessary to answer a question or to complete his story, he should
say so. The child should further explicitly be reassured that not knowing
the answer to any particular question or issue is perfectly acceptable.
66
If these purposes are explained to a child in simple words, and if he
acknowledges an understanding of the importance of giving a truthful
account, there is everything to be gained and little, if anything, to be
lost in the attempt. The authors submit that the videotaping statute
should require that the interviewer or monitor should open a videotaping
session with such an explanation.
Several limitations upon the interviewing process serve to eliminate
at least some of the more obvious distorting influences.
The Louisiana statute does not expressly require that the taking of
the child's statement be in an interview format. However, young children,
particularly preschool victims, are rarely capable on their own of de-
livering a complete monologue about the abuse incident. Social scientists
have documented two fundamental facts about children's memory: first,
the ability to spontaneously recall details of some past encounter increases
with age, and, thus, that very young children will need assistance; 67 and
second, human memory capacity develops at a very early age, and, thus,
children actually absorb more data than they are able to recall unass-
isted. 61 Consequently, not only will an interview by some adult ordinarily
be necessary, but also skillful questioning of a child can actually enhance
the reliability of any resulting account.
Paradoxically, empirical data also substantiates the conclusion that
a child is more susceptible to memory distortion or memory manipulation
by some influential interviewer than is an adult. As a result, the neu-
trality, knowledge, and sensitivity of the interviewer are critical to the
reliability of any resulting account of events given by a child. 69 When
the child has not only been a witness to an event but also was the
direct victim of a physical or sexual encounter, accurate retrieval of his
memories becomes an even more delicate and complex task.
While the Louisiana statute does not designate who must serve as
the interviewer, it does deny the interviewer's role to two groups who
66. For further discussion, see Perry & Teply, supra note 17.
67. Matin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, The Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3
Law and Hum. Behav. 295 (1979); Perlmutter & Myers, Development of Recall in 2- to
4-Year Olds, 15 Dev. Psychology 73 (1979).
68. See, e.g., Goodman, The Child Witness: Conclusions and Future Directions for
Research and Legal Practice, 40 J. Soc. Issues 157, 162 (1984).
69. See, e.g., Cohen & Harnick, supra note 19; cf. Marin, supra note 67. For a
summary of extant data on children's suggestibility, see Loftus & Davies, Distortions in
the Memory of Children, 40 J. Soc. Issues 51 (1984).
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are most likely to be motivated to skew the child's memory. Neither
any of the victim's relatives 0 nor the attorney "for either party ' 71 are
allowed in the interview room. (Since these procedures pertain to criminal
prosecutions of the abuse perpetrator, presumably the attorney exclusion
also includes prosecutors, albeit as representatives of the state rather
than of a "party" in the ordinary sense of the term.)
A substantial body of research now exists about the nature and
impact of trauma upon human memory. One symptom among the cluster
known as the Post-traumatic Stress Disorder is a decline in cognitive
performance. 72 Studies of traumatized children, including victims of sex-
ual or physical assault, reveal an increased misperception of both the
duration and sequencing of actual events and a fixation upon certain
perceptual details whereby the child relives and recounts over and over
what for the child were his "worst moments." ' 73 Particularly where the
child has been victimized by a stranger, distortions in cognitive func-
tioning are predictable.
The complexity of the interviewer's task to unravel an accurate
account of events from a child victim has been vividly illustrated by
the psychiatrist who conducted a series of studies on the child victims
of the Chowchilla schoolbus kidnapping incident:
[Six year old] Benji knows exactly what was done to him.
He remembers the events of the kidnapping and what other
children did and said. He elaborates upon what he himself did
and said, hoping that he was more heroic than he actually was.
He loses [temporarily] his accuracy in the field of perception,
the ability to recognize the perpetrators, and in the field of
cognition, understanding his own role in the* traumatic event.
Benji does not lie, or purposely change facts. He distorts the
perception of the men themselves because he was so suddenly
and intensely frightened when he saw them. He distorts his own
role because his true helplessness is unacceptable to him and
too remote from his ideals of strength and control to be tol-
erated.74
70. La. R.S. 15:440.4(A)(2) (Supp. 1987) states: "That no relative of the victim of
the physical or sexual abuse was present in the room where the recording was made."
71. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(1) (Supp. 1987) states as a precondition for the admissibility
of the recording that "[n]o attorney for either party was present when the statement was
made."
72. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders §§ 308.30, 309.81 (3d ed. 1980).
73. Pynoos & Eth, supra note 37.
74. Terr, supra note 37, at 214-15.
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The difficulties of obtaining a full account from a child traumatized
by sexual abuse are so considerable that one scientist has identified what
he has termed the "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome." '7
The manifest symptoms characterizing this phenomenon are the victim's
secrecy, helplessness, entrapment, and accommodation to the assailant;
delayed and unconvincing disclosure; and retraction of the accusation. 76
The interview with a trauma-stressed child victim is such a critical
stage in the evolution of an abuse prosecution that some commentators
have called for the appointment of new specialists, trained in child
development and interaction, who can serve as pretrial interviewers. 77
The Louisiana statute stops short of requiring interviewer expertise,
requiring, instead, only skilled supervision. Although it might be more
efficient and less costly to impose qualifications of expertise upon the
interviewer, rather than requiring monitoring by a skilled supervisor,
-there is nothing inherently wrong with the current Louisiana scheme,
provided, as discussed previously, that law enforcement officers are
excluded from the list of authorized monitors.78 With the implementation
of training and certification procedures by the Department of Health
and Human Resources, 79 there may be in the near future a cadre of
highly trained professionals who can oversee the videotaping process.
The statute's single limitation upon the manner or scope of the
taking of the child's account is that neither leading questions nor leading
interrogatories are to be used to elicit the child's statements.80 The
sanction for the abuse of the interviewer's role is that the resulting
recording can be ruled incompetent and denied admissibility. There is
nothing inherently vicious in leading questions so long as the witness's
own will has not been overborne or his memories supplanted by the
interviewer's suggested details.
The real danger in eliciting a child's recall lies in the use of misleading
questions. In a widely reported study, two social scientists undertook a
study of the relative suggestibility of nine year olds, twelve year olds,
and college-aged students. In their test, the to-be-remembered episode
75. R. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Int'l J. Child
Abuse & Neglect 177 (1983).
76. See Note, The Admissibility of "Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,"
17 Pac. L.J. 1361 (1986).
77. See Parker, supra note 62, at 655; Terr, supra note 37, at 220.
78. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
79. La. R.S. 15:440.4(B) (Supp. 1987) states that the Department "shall develop and
promulgate regulations on or before September 12, 1984, regarding training requirements
and certification for department personnel designated in Paragraph (A)(5) who supervise
the taking of the child's statement."
80. La. R.S. 15:440.4(3) and 440.5(4) (Supp. 1987).
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was presented in a film which showed a young woman, who was carrying
a shopping bag, entering a bus. In subsequent tests, the subjects were
asked a series of questions, half of which were misleading, for example,
"The young woman was carrying a newspaper when she entered the
bus, wasn't she?" The results showed a significant resistance to sug-
gestibility which increases with age. In this study, the nine-year olds
were more than twice as likely to agree with the suggested misleading
question than were the older subjects.',
More troubling is the additional finding that once error is imprinted
by misleading questioning, dislodging it later is very difficult. In a second
test of "long-term" memory, conducted one week after the film's view-
ing, a multiple choice questionnaire was distributed which presented the
following possible answers to the question of what the woman was
carrying: a shopping bag, a newspaper, and two other neutral choices.
Regardless of age, those subjects who had in fact been earlier swayed
by the misleading question, almost always chose the response containing
that piece of erroneous detail. Because the nine-year olds had been more
likely initially to accept the misleading suggestion, they proved to be
the most unreliable of the subject groups.82 As these researchers con-
cluded:
The data provide further evidence that memory may be com-
prised of information gleaned in the initial perception of events
coupled with suggestions supplied after the fact. . . . Further,
since this study has demonstrated that leading questions put by
an interrogator on one occasion can affect responses to questions
put by a different interrogator on a second occasion, this rec-
ommendation refers not only to courtroom interrogation but
also to precourtroom interrogation by, for example, the police.83
C. Pretrial Use of Videotapes
In a typical case, a prosecution witness will undergo a series of
pretrial encounters including informal interviewing by police and pros-
ecuting attorneys as well as formal pretrial appearances, either at a
preliminary hearing or before a grand jury, or both. Recall that the
overriding purpose of the Louisiana videotaping statute was to eliminate
as many interviews and appearances as possible which the child witness
81. Cohen & Harnick, supra note 19, at 207.
82. The proportions of wrong responses made on suggestive items, which were in
the direction of the misleading suggestions were 94% (nine-year olds); 94% (twelve-year
olds); and 88% (college-aged students). Id. at 208.
83. Id. at 209.
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would otherwise be called upon to make. Reducing the number of times
that the child will have to repeat her "story" in person, in front of
strangers, ought to reduce the child's attendant trauma.
The informal, often unnecessary, bureaucratic interviews might well
be eliminated in their entirety through the use of the videotaped state-
ment. Although the child's resilience in the face of cross-examination
would not have been. tested, investigators might well be content to
recommend or decline prosecution based upon their assessment of the
child's credibility from the videotaped account. Similarly, since grand
juries ordinarily hear only uncross-examined prosecution evidence,84 a
videotape would seem to be an adequate substitute for the child's ap-
pearance in person before the jurors. The only problem which arises is
that the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a witness
must be placed under oath before giving grand jury testimony." In
anticipation of this requirement, the child should be sworn to tell the
truth at the beginning of the videotaped interview.
The use of the videotape at a preliminary hearing presents more
complex issues. In most jurisdictions, including Louisiana, the prelim-
inary hearing serves several discrete formal functions: it "screens" charges,
resolving the issue of probable cause; 6 it decides the issue of pretrial
restraint and sets bail, if appropriate;17 and it can preserve testimony
for trial if a witness later becomes unavailable.88 There is no consti-
tutional requirement that a preliminary hearing be provided so long as
a state provides some mechanism for a judicial determination of probable
cause, bail,89 and for apprising the defendant of the nature of the charges
84. La. Code Crim. P. art. 442 states that the grand jury "shall hear" all evidence
presented by the prosecution. It may hear defense evidence but is not required to do so.
85. The Louisiana Criminal Code requires that a witness must be administered an
oath "to speak the truth . . . and to keep secret . . . matters which he learns at the
grand jury." La. Code Crim. P. art. 440. Since a videotape is being offered in lieu of
the child's appearance as a "witness," the oath of truthful testimony is arguably unnec-
essary for the receipt of the recorded hearsay statement. However, as we argue elsewhere,
see supra note 64 and accompanying text, the recorded interview should properly contain
a discussion of the necessity of truthful recollection and might also show that a formal
oath was administered to the child. When the prosecution elects to submit a videotape
rather than to summon the child as a live witness, obviously the child would not appear,
and thus the secrecy of the grand jury would not be compromised.
86. La. Code Crim. P. art. 296.
87. Id.
88. La. Code of Crim. P. art. 295.
89. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975), the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable
cause as a prerequisite to any significant pretrial restraint of liberty.
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against him and his constitutional rights at trial. 90 By custom, however,
the preliminary hearing also provides the defendant with an important
discovery opportunity and encourages plea negotiations between the de-
fense and prosecution.
The defendant's discovery opportunities are eliminated when, instead
of a live witness, the prosecution offers her videotaped statement in
absentia. Although the defendant will be able to see and hear the child
making his accusation, he will not be able to conduct any cross-ex-
amination of the child. In Gerstein v. Pugh,9 the Supreme Court ex-
pressly declined to hold that the Fourth Amendment requires an adversarial
hearing for the determination of probable cause. 92 Although the Con-
stitution does not require pretrial cross-examination of adverse wit-
nesses, 93 Article 294 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure does
grant the defendant the right to cross-examine any prosecution witness
offered at a preliminary hearing. However, in seeking to introduce a
videotaped statement the prosecution is not offering the child as a witness
but is instead offering a hearsay statement, which is permissible at the
preliminary hearing under Louisiana law. 94 This interpretation is rein-
forced by the evidentiary distinction, preserved in the videotaping statute, 91
90. The formal notice of charges and rights is usually accomplished in a separate
judicial hearing known variously as an arraignment or initial appearance. La. Code of
Crim. P. arts. 230.1, 551.
91. 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
92. As Mr. Justice Stewart observed:
These adversary safeguards [counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses] are not essential for the probable cause
determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The solc issue is whether
there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further pro-
ceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing.
The standard is the same as that for arrest [which] . . . traditionally has been
decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written
testimony, and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof....
This is not to say that confrontation and cross-examination might not enhance
the reliability of probable cause determinations in some cases. In most cases,
however, their value would be too slight to justify holding, as a matter of
constitutional principle, that these formalities and safeguards designed for trial
must also be employed in making the Fourth Amendment determination of
probable cause.
Id. at 120-22, 95 S. Ct. at 866-67 (footnote omitted).
93. There are constitutionally protected discovery rights which will be discussed in
Part IV of this article.
94. "No preliminary examination shall be held invalid for any purpose because of
an informality or error that does not substantially prejudice the defendant." La. Code
of Crim. P. art. 298. Certainly there is no constitutional prohibition against the use of
hearsay at the probable cause hearing. See supra note 86.
95. "The admission into evidence of the videotape of a child as authorized herein
shall not preclude the prosecution from calling the child as a witness or taking the child's




between the videotape as documentary evidence and the calling of the
child as a witness. If, instead, article 294 is rigorously construed, then
the prosecution would be put to a choice: it may avoid a preliminary
hearing by seeking an early indictment,96 or it may present the videotape
at a preliminary hearing and offer the child for cross-examination.
Beyond question, the opportunity to view a videotape of the child's
statement enables the defendant to make a more informed plea decision
and appears even to encourage the choice of a guilty plea. The authors
of a study prepared for the Department of Justice conducted telephone
interviews with police and prosecutors of child sexual abuse and have
reported:
Many prosecutors have observed an unanticipated, yet welcome
side effect of videotaping a child's early statement: it tends to
prompt a guilty-plea when viewed by defendants and their at-
torneys. Apparently, the defense reasons that a child who per-
forms well on videotape will perform equally well in court. .... 97
Similarly, in a 1983 study of Minnesota child abuse prosecutions, 60 of
75 defendants pleaded guilty after having viewed videotaped interviews
of the child victims. 98
D. Admissibility as Evidence at Trial
1. Statutory Requirements
The foundation for the authentication of any videotape is a showing
that the resulting visual and oral recording is accurate, unaltered, and
in fact purports to be what it is: "what the witness [any observer
authorized to be present who speaks during the process] or victim said." 99
There are four clear elements of the proponent's burden:
(1) that, as previously discussed, the strictures of R.S. 15:440.5
which govern the conduct of the interview have been complied
with; 100
96. La. Code of Crim. P. art. 292 expressly provides that "[aifter the defendant has
been indicted by a grand jury, the court may rescind its order for a preliminary exam-
ination."
97. Whitcomb, Shapiro & Stellwagen, When the Victim Is a Child: Issues for Judges
and Prosecutors 1, 60 (U.S. Dept. Justice, 1985).
98. Lawscope, 70 A.B.A. J. 36 (April 1984).
99. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(3) (Supp. 1987).
100. See supra note 56. The admissibility section explicitly requires only a showing
that no attorney for either party was present. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(1) (Supp. 1987).
Presumably the additional requirements for a qualifying "competent" interview contained
in 15:440.4 also must be demonstrated to the court's satisfaction.
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(2) that the recording is accurate and has not been altered; l'0
(3) that every voice on the recording is identified; 02 and
(4) that the defendant or his attorney has been afforded the
opportunity to view the recording during the pretrial stages of
the case. 03
The remaining two prerequisites for admissibility are more problematic:
(5) that both the child"°4 and the person conducting the child's
interview'05 are "available" for live testimony at trial;'06 and
(6) that "the statement was not made in response to questioning
[or interrogatories] o7 calculated to lead the child to make a
particular statement."0 8
2. Filling in the Gaps
Perhaps the greatest single gap in this legislation is its silence con-
cerning trial procedures governing authentication and competency rulings,
the receipt of the videotape into evidence, and the direct and cross-
examination of the child. In an effort to read between the lines of the
statute, as it is currently worded, let us reconsider the fact pattern of
the first Louisiana videotaping case, State v. R.C., Jr.0 9 As is usual,"10
here the only witness to the sexual assault was the child victim. The
prosecution had prepared and wanted to tender into evidence a videotape
of the five year old victim's statement, a copy of which had been shared
with the defendant. Unless waived by stipulation, what foundation, if
any, is required of the prosecutor? Can the court simply first view the
proffered videotape, reserving its ruling upon any objection? The defend-
ant has several potential sets of challenges: that the child is not a
101. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(3) (Supp. 1987).
102. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(5) (Supp. 1987).
103. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(7) (Supp. 1987). While unambiguous, this requirement does
present some constitutional issues which will be deferred until Part IV of this article.
104. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(8) (Supp. 1987).
105. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(6) (Supp. 1987).
106. The meaning of the "availability" requirement is discussed in greater detail in
Part IV of this article.
107. This requirement is imposed by La. R.S. 15:440.4(A)(3) (Supp. 1987).
108. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(4) (Supp. 1987).
109. 494 So. 2d 1350 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
110. "The more common scenario .. .is that there is no physical proof, either because
the physicians examining the children were not looking for it or missed it, or because
the abuse was such that it left the child with no telltale signs." Rust, supra note 13, at
15. See also Barbieri & Berliner, supra note 37, at 129.
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competent witness;"' that the videotaped interview has been improperly
conducted or otherwise improperly recorded according to the statutory
requirements; and perhaps that the resulting videotaped interview oth-
erwise constitutes untrustworthy evidence." 2
In R.C., Jr., the first step in the trial court's process was to conduct
a competency examination of the five-year-old victim." 3 The question
arises whether such a preliminary determination was essential to the
admissibility of the videotape. The videotaping statutes make no reference
to the general statutory procedure governing child witness competency.14
In fact, Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:440.4(A) expressly sets out the
requirements necessary "[tlo render such a videotape competent evi-
dence,""' which certainly seems to indicate that a general competency
inquiry is not only unnecessary but even superseded by the satisfaction
of its special criteria.
The fundamental justification for the receipt of any hearsay evidence,
as an exception to the hearsay rule, is that a particular declaration
derives its credability from the reassuring strength of the circumstances
surrounding its making 'rather than from any abstract notions of the
veracity of the declarant."16 Logically, ordinary competency voir dires
ought to be precluded, provided that an enabling videotaping statute
has adequately defined the criteria of reliability. But therein lies the
problem with the Louisiana statute.
The core concept of any videotaping statute is the standard it creates
for the measurement of the reliability of the out-of-court statement. For
that matter, the touchstone for every evidentiary rule, including every
Ill. The interrelationship between the competency of videotapes as documentary evi-
dence and the competency of the child declarant is an issue which has troubled many
enacting states. See Whitcomb, supra note 97, at 73-74.
112. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A) (Supp. 1987) states that if its criteria are met, the videotape
"may be offered into evidence" which seems to indicate that there is some residuum of
discretion in the trial court, that is, even if the enumerated requirements were met, a
defendant might successfully object on proof of other indications of unreliability.
113. 494 So. 2d 1350, 1351.
114. La. R.S. 15:469 (1981).
115. La. R.S. 15:440.4(A) (Supp. 1987) (Emphasis supplied).
116. For example, the classic explanation of the admissibility of a res gestae statement
is that it is not regarded as deliberative or conscious expression of the declarant but as
"the event speaking through" him. Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37 Wash. L. Rev.
303, 307 n.32 (1962). However, as Wigmore has conceded:
These two principles-necessity and trustworthiness-are only imperfectly carried
out in the detailed rules under the [hearsay] exceptions. . . .The two principles
are not applied with equal strictness in every exception; sometimes one, sometimes
the other, has been chiefly in mind. In one or two instances one of them is
practically lacking.
5 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law 254 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
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exception to the hearsay rule, is its reliability quotient. 1 7 In this sense,
the heart of the Louisiana videotaping exception is hollow: no attempt
has been made by the legislature to establish reliability criteria for the
trial court's use, other than the oblique prohibition against leading
questions. Although Louisiana's statute is not uniquely flawed," 8 it is
rather easily mended.
Rule 807 of the Uniform Rules requires simply that the court find
that "the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.""19 The comments
are much more illuminating and could well be enacted as a list of
appropriate, relevant criteria for reliability and hence admissibility.1 20 To
the potentially distorting circumstances already proscribed by the Lou-
isiana statute, the following other considerations would be taken into
account:
the age of the minor; his or her physical and mental condition;
the circumstances of the alleged event; the language used by the
minor; the existence of corroborative evidence; the existence of
any apparent motive to falsify; . .. the time when the statement
was made; the number of interviews of the minor prior to the
statement; and whether there exists any evidence of undue in-
fluence or pressure on the minor at or before the time of
recording. 121
To this listing, we submit these two additional factors which should
be included: the length of time between the observations and its first
report to an adult; and any variations, including retractions, in the
117. Of course, there are also constitutional dimensions to procedural and evidentiary
rules which conflict with an accused's trial rights. These concerns are addressed in Part
IV of this article.
118. Only three state statutes do refer to such a standard, albeit using a general proviso
that "the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability." See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-116
(Supp. 1986); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A-44-120 (Supp. 1987).
119. Unif. R. of Evid. 807 (adopted Nov. 1986). This standard apparently derived
from that previously enacted in Washington. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.120(l) (Supp.
1987).
120. The presence and role of attorneys, the manner of eliciting the minor's statements
during the interview, the significance of the role played by any unidentified speaker,
absolute prerequisites or disqualifications under Louisiana law, and the accuracy of the
resulting audio-visual recording are circumstances which are to be taken into account
under the Uniform Rule. Unif. R. of Evid. 807 (adopted Nov. 1986) official comments.
121. Id.
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child's account which have occurred in the interim between the first
report and the time of trial. 2
Until such time as the Louisiana statute is amended, we may expect
to continue to hear defense objections on general grounds of the in-
competency of the child-declarant. How then should such objections be
handled? Must an initial examination of the child on the witness stand
be conducted before the videotape is viewed? Louisiana Revised Statute
15:469 outlines the generally applicable procedure as well as the sub-
stantive test for "competency":
Understanding, and not age, must determine whether any person
tendered as a witness shall be sworn; but no child less than
twelve years of age shall, over the objection either of the district
attorney or of the defendant, be sworn as a witness, until the
court is satisfied, after examination, that such child has sufficient
understanding to be a witness.'23
Early cases insistent upon belief in divine punishment and a specific
understanding of the nature of an oath have long since been discarded
in this jurisdiction. 2 4 While still focusing upon whether a child knows
the difference between truth and falsehood as one of the determinants
of "intelligence,' ' 2 5 the appellate courts have placed a growing emphasis
upon the child's ability to receive a just impression of the facts, to retain
an independent recollection of those facts, and to communicate thdse
facts. 2 6 The Louisiana appellate courts have never disqualified a child 2 7
122. Factors suggested by other commentators include: whether the statement was made
while the child was still upset or in pain because of the incident; whether the statement
appears to be a product of the child's own making, that is, is it "age-appropriate" for
the child or the product of another's engineering; whether anything occurred between the
event and the child's narration which might otherwise account for the statement. See
Whitcomb, supra note 97, at 74-75, summarizing suggestions made in Note, Sexual Abuse
of Children: Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 813, 827 (1983).
123. La. R.S. 15:469 (1981).
124. State v. Williams, III La. 179, 35 So. 505 (1903), overruling State v. Washington,
49 La. Ann. 1602, 22 So. 841 (1897).
125. State v. Noble, 342 So. 2d 170 (La. 1977).
126. This is basically a recapitulation of the factors put forward by Wigmore: "[clapacity
to observe; capacity to recollect; capacity to communicate; capacity to understand questions;
capacity to frame intelligent responses; and, a sense of moral responsibility." 2 J. Wigmore,
Wigmore on Evidence § 506 (3d ed. 1940). See, e.g., State v. Arnaud, 412 So. 2d 1013
(La. 1982), in which a four-year-old witness was found competent to testify to his mother's
rape.
127. Although the statutory test of competency is not tied to the attainment of any
specific age, the Louisiana courts have never yet upheld a trial court's determination of
competency of any child below the age of four. See State v. Wilson, 109 La. 74, 33 So.
85 (1902), and State v. Dykes, 440 So. 2d 88 (La. 1983), where three-year-olds were
found to be incompetent to testify. Both four-year-olds, Arnaud, 412 So. 2d 1013, and
five-year-olds, Noble, 342 So. 2d 170 have been held competent.
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simply because he becomes emotional, 28 hesitates when answering ques-
tions, 2 9 or is ignorant of proper anatomical terms.110
Under the videotaping statute, however, the issue remains open
whether the competency determination can be based solely upon the
videotape, without additional direct examination. In view of the liberal
construction of competency which is enjoined upon trial courts, it is
difficult to see how a defendant could be prejudiced by a preliminary
competency ruling based upon the videotape's demonstration of the
child's demeanor, responsiveness, moral appreciation of the consequences
of his accusation, and other elements of his "intelligence." Consequently,
we assume that ruling on the competency objection is properly reserved
until after the videotape is tendered and viewed.' 3' At that point, the
defendant must be offered the right to cross-examine the child further
on the issue of the reliability of the videotaped statement and the child's
competency as a witness if he is to give testimony at the trial.
3 2
Unless -waived by stipulation, the prosecutor's foundation for the
admissibility of the videotape is met by calling the child interviewer (or
the interview "supervisor") as a witness. For example, in State v. R.C.,
Jr. , 3 3 the state examined the DHHR Child Protection Investigator who
had interviewed the child victim. Presumably, under the statute's current
wording, this witness must be willing to testify that no attorney for
either party nor any relative of the victim was present in the interviewing
room and that the interview was supervised by some authorized indi-
vidual. Further, the witness must be prepared to identify the voice of
every person who speaks during the recording. This witness might also
assert that the recording was voluntarily made by the child and that no
misleading questions were asked, but, of course, these issues can only
be resolved by viewing the videotape itself. Similarly, unless waived by
128. In Noble, 342 So. 2d 170, a recess was necessary so that the five-year-old rape
victim could compose herself; and in State v. Johanson, 332 So. 2d 270 (La. 1976), a
ten-year-old rape victim cried throughout her testimony.
129. In State v. Foy, 439 So. 2d 433 (La. 1983), a six-year-old witness to the murders
of two other children was held competent: "[A] child's sometimes hesitant or unresponsive
answers do not necessarily indicate incompetency. .. . Instead, they may be part of the
child's overall demeanor in the unfamiliar courtroom experience that favorably reflects
testimony only as to what is clear to the child. ... Id. at 435.
130. Johanson, 332 So. 2d 270.
131. In Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App. 14 Dist. 1984), the appellate court
affirmed a trial court ruling that no preliminary inquiry into the child's competence was
necessary. After an independent viewing of the tape, the appellate court affirmed the
competency ruling.
132. See 'the discussion of Kentucky v. Stincer, 55 U.S.L.W. 4901 (U.S. June 19,
1987), a child witness competency case, in Part IV of this article.
133. 494 So. 2d 1350 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
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stipulation, the videotaping cameraman, videotape custodian, or an elec-
tronics expert (or conceivably all three) would need to be called to attest
to the unaltered accuracy of the videotape.
Once these preliminaries are concluded in favor of the proponent,
can the videotape now be shown, or must the state summon the child
for direct examination? In R.C., Jr., the state put the child victim on
the stand as a witness and adduced testimony confirming the accuracy
of her prior videotaped statement. 3 4 This is, however, not a required
step under the Louisiana statute, which says simply that the child must
be "available to testify."''
The introduction of a qualifying videotape is an additive means
available to a Louisiana prosecutor for eliciting the child's narrative of
the abusive encounter. If he so chooses, the prosecutor may decide to
call the child as a witness or produce a deposition of the child, apparently
either in lieu of or in addition to the introduction of a videotape into
evidence. 3 6 Although predictably a defendant may assert that his con-
stitutional rights to confrontation are violated when the child is not
produced as the state's witness on direct examination, 3 7 the Louisiana
videotaping statute does not require the extraordinary precautions taken
by the prosecutor in R.C., Jr.
After the trial court views the videotape, any objections to the use
of misleading questions, lack of voluntariness, or other aspects of po-
tential unreliability can be resolved. However, it must be noted that the
Louisiana statute's absolute prohibition of the use of leading questions 38
can lead to absurd results. Arguably, should a defendant be able to
demonstrate the use of any leading question, the competency of the
entire recording would be jeopardized. Suppose the interviewer, con-
fronted with a child who is frozen by nervousness, resorts to a series
of inconsequential, warm-up questions, such as, "Aren't you eight years
old?" or "Do you live at 34 Jones Street with your parents and younger
sister?" Though these questions are undeniably leading, in the accepted
connotation of that term, their use ought not to vitiate the force of a
134. "The victim was called by the state as a witness. On direct examination, she
referred to the defendant as 'Junior,' his nickname, and identified him. She testified that
she had related the incident to her mother and to [the DHHR interviewer] and that if
she were asked the same questions as [the interviewer] had asked her before, she would
give the same answers." R.C., Jr., 494 So. 2d at 1351.
135. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(8) (Supp. 1987).
136. La. R.S. 15:440(B) (Supp. 1987).
137. This issue will be explored in Part IV which concerns constitutional challenges
to the Louisiana statute.
138. La. R.S. 15:440.4(A)(3) (Supp. 1987) mandates "[tihat such recording was not
made of answers to interrogatories calculated to lead the child to make any particular
statement." See also La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(4) (Supp. 1987).
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remaining account of the child's assault, provided the child thereafter
recovers his balance and displays an independent recollection of the
critical encounter. 3 9
Although the Louisiana statute does not distinguish between the use
of material and immaterial leading questions, Louisiana jurisprudence
has long recognized that some greater leeway should be afforded counsel
faced with the task of adducing a child's testimony. 4 In construing
this statute, courts should evaluate the impact of any question found
to be "leading" upon the reliability of a particular strand of inquiry
or upon the recording taken as a whole by using a distortion analysis,
permitting untainted portions to be received into evidence. Apparently
this tack was taken by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in its recent
videotaping decision, State v. Feazell.'4' The defendant there urged that
leading questions had been used to interview the seven year old victim.
The court brushed aside this argument, stating: "[N]otwithstanding the
general rule against leading questions, the matter is largely within the
discretion of the trial court and in the absence of the palpable abuse
of that discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused, a finding of
reversible error is not warranted.' ' 42
In contrast, if the defendant can demonstrate that the child's version
has been distorted through the interviewer's manipulation, then the
recording should not be received into evidence at trial. For example,
the defendant might well be able to demonstrate that the recording,
taken as a whole, reveals little by way of an independent recollection
by the child'but is, instead, a course of suggestive questioning in which
the child has simply acquiesced.
As currently written, the Louisiana videotaping statute does not
clearly reserve the right of the defendant to object to portions of the
recording, even if, taken as a whole, the videotape appears to have
been reliably conducted. Suppose, for example, that in the course of
identifying the defendant as her assailant, the child adds that she was
afraid of him because everyone in the neighborhood knew that the
139. See Mallory v. State, 699 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. App. 6 Dist. 1985):
Leading questions that are isolated, or those concerning the details of testimony
already given in response to proper interrogation, or those concerning matters
not directly related to the offense, will not destroy the tape's admissibility so
long as the overall product is not the result of suggestion.
Accord, Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App. 14 Dist. 1984); Woods v. State, 713
S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986).
140. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 456 So. 2d 642 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied,
461 So. 2d 312 (La. 1984).
141. 486 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 491 So. 2d 20 (La. 1986).
142. Id. at 330.
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defendant had just gotten out of jail, because the defendant had raped
another friend the day before, or because her mother had told her that
he was a "bad man." The defendant ought to be able to object to the
admissibility of any portion of the videotaped interview which contains
highly prejudicial information, "hearsay within hearsay," or is otherwise
objectionable under the general rules of evidence. In instances in which
objections are sustained, the tape could rather simply be edited, under
court supervision, to remove the offending portions. The statute should
be clarified to provide that the court must entertain and resolve any
objections to the admissibility of the recording, either in whole or in
part, before submitting it to a jury.
Predictably in most cases, defense objections to the admissibility of
the videotaped recording can be resolved by the court's simply viewing
the recording. However, it is potentially quite possible that through
cross-examination of the child or some other individual as an adverse
witness, the defendant may be able to present evidence of distortion
which would not be apparent on the face of the recording. As previously
discussed, the authors are recommending that the Louisiana statute be
amended to provide that the videotape must provide sufficient circum-
stantial indicia of reliability, 43 in addition to the rather minimal safe-
guards of its current wording. For example, in situations in which the
defendant makes an offer of proof that the child was "prepped,"
"woodshedded," or otherwise suggestively interviewed before the re-
cording was made, the court quite properly should reserve ruling on
the admissibility of the videotaped recording until these issues are ex-
plored and resolved.
E. Confidentiality
The confidentiality provision of any videotaping law is an important
feature of its child-protection armament'" but is universally non-con-
troversial. The Louisiana version 45 presents an unambiguous command.
In order to protect the privacy of the child, any videotape, which becomes
a part of the court record, must be preserved under a protective order
of the court. Unless an appeal is filed, the court must order the de-
struction of the videotapes after an elapse of five years from the date
of the final judgment.
143. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
144. "Even if videotapes are not intended for use as evidence at trial, their mere
existence may pose a threat to the victim's privacy. Confidentiality cannot be guaranteed
and videotape excerpts have reportedly appeared on media broadcasts." Whitcomb, supra
note 97, at 62.
145. La. R.S. 15:440.6 (Supp. 1987).
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LOUISIANA STATUTE
When new procedural or evidentiary rules are authorized which affect
the trial rights of an accused, issues of constitutional dimension arise.
Furthermore, we know that assertion of the state's parens patriae duty
to protect children is not a cure-all justification.146 Until the 1986-87
term of the United States Supreme Court, one could have predicted
rather comfortably the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute. How-
ever, with the release of the Court's recent decision in Kentucky v.
Stincer147 some more impassioned defense of that prediction now seems
necessary.
A. The Right of Confrontation
1. Postponed Cross-examination
The creation of a new explicit exception to a state's hearsay rule148
raises rather serious questions of the compatibility of the new exception
with an accused defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.'4 9 The constitutional vulnerability of videotap-
ing statutes arises out of their attempt to provide an alternative procedure
to the deposition mechanism.
Under this special statute, before trial, the child will either give an
unaided narrative of the assault or be interviewed about the event without
contemporaneous cross-examination by the accused assailant, indeed out
of the presence of either the defendant or his counsel. Shielding a young
victim from confrontation with an alleged assailant seems to run precisely
counter to a defendant's right to face his accuser. Much has already
been written concerning the constitutionality of child victim videotaping
146. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 569, 102 S. Ct. 2513
(1982), the Supreme Court held that the state's generalized concern in avoiding further
trauma for minor victims of sexual offenses and its interest in encouraging such victims
to come forward and testify provided inadequate justification for excluding the public
while the child testified in a criminal proceeding. Such a broadly drawn statute unduly
compromised the First Amendment rights of the public and press to have access to criminal
trials.
147. 55 U.S.L.W. 4901 (June 19, 1987).
148. Arguably, the existing past-recollection-recorded exception to the hearsay rule
could be used to permit the introduction of a child's videotaped statement. Fed. R. Evid.
803(5); La. R.S. 15:434 (1981). In terms of reliability indicia, the premises underlying the
receipt of past recollections recorded are indistinguishable from those supporting the
admissibility of a videotape. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
149. U.S. Const. amend. VI and XIV. See also, La. Const. art. 1, § 16.
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statutes which are similar in design to Louisiana's law.150 More impor-
tantly, in the six states which have enacted statutes similar to Louisiana's,
all states but Texas have rejected constitutional challenges when as-
serted.' Two Courts of Appeal in Louisiana have upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Louisiana statute. 152 These developments have occurred,
however, before the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of the Con-
frontation Clause in Kentucky v. Stincer.5 3
In Stincer, the confrontation claim arose out of an in-chambers
competency examination of two child witnesses from which the defendant
had been excluded, though he was represented by counsel. A majority
of the Court ultimately rejected the defendant's assertion of constitu-
tional error'5 4 and affirmed his conviction for first degree sodomy. Said
Mr. Justice Blackmun for the majority, the appropriate test for a Con-
frontation Clause violation is not whether the challenged procedure is
a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings but "whether the defend-
ant's presence at the proceeding would have contributed to the defend-
150. Note, The Testimony of Child Abuse Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two
Legislative Innovations, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 806 (1985); Note, The Use of Videotaped
Testimony of Victims in Cases Involving Sexual Abuse: A Constitutional Dilemma, 14
Hofstra L. Rev. 261 (1985); Note, Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelines for State Criminal
Trials, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 475 (1985); Note, Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases,
83 Colum. L. Rev. 1745 (1983).
151. Arkansas: McGuire v. State, 706 S.W.2d 360 (Ark. 1986); Chappell v. State, 710
S.W.2d 214 (Ark. App. 1985); Kansas: State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. 325, 729 P.2d 1160
(Kan. 1986); Kentucky: Gaines v. Commonwealth, No. 86-SC-39-MR (Ky. Sup. Ct., Mar.
17, 1987) (held unconstitutional on other grounds); Minnesota: In re Welfare of M.S.M.,
387 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. App. 1986); In the Matter of the Welfare of W.W.M., 400
N.W.2d 203 (Minn. App. 1987); Tennessee: State v. Powell, No. 255 (Tenn. Ct. Crim.
App., Mar. 17, 1987). The sixth state, Arizona, has yet to consider an appeal on the
issue of its statute's constitutionality.
The Texas statute was recently held unconstitutional on both due process and con-
frontation grounds in Long v. State, No. 867-85 (Tex. Crim. App. July 1, 1987). Prior
to Long, constitutional hallenges were rejected in at least eight cases: Jolly v. State, 681
S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App. 14 Dist. 1984); Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.
11 Dist. 1985); Clark v. State, 748 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App. Ft. Worth 1987); Newman
v. State, 700 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App. 1 Dist. 1985); Tolbert v. State, 697 S.W.2d 795
(Tex. App. 1 Dist. 1985); Mallory v. State, 699 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. App. 6 Dist. 1985);
Pierce v. State, 724 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. App. Austin 1987); and Gibson v. State, No. A14-
86-409CR (Tex. App. 14 Dist. April 16, 1987).
152. State v. Feazell, 486 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), writ den. 491 So. 2d
20 (La. 1986); State v. Guidroz, 498 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
153. 55 U-.S.L.W. 4901 (June 19, 1987).
154. The majority rejected both the defendant's confrontation and due process claims.
It refused to review his effective assistance of counsel claim because it was not raised
before the lower court nor did it arise to the level of "an exceptional case." Id. at 4905,
n.22. The dissenters, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, would find a violation of
the Confrontation Clause and withhold ruling on due process because the issue was not
addressed by the state court below.
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ant's opportunity to defend himself against the charges."' 5 In adopting
this case-by-case, functional approach, Mr. Justice Blackmun identified
four important factors in the application of this test to the challenged
in-chambers procedure: (1) all questions and answers given in the chal-
lenged procedure could have been easily repeated in the defendant's
presence at trial; (2) the two child witnesses thereafter did appear and
testify in open court; (3) they were then subject to a full and complete
cross-examination on the competency issue;156 and (4) the challenged
procedure did not involve substantive testimony about the alleged of-
fense.15 7
The Court's special emphasis on the final, fourth factor presents
the most troublesome hurdle for a constitutional defense of statement
videotaping statutes. As Mr. Justice Blackmun appeared to have been
warning in the opinion's conclusion:
Thus, although a competency hearing in which a witness is asked
to discuss upcoming, substantive testimony might bear a sub-
stantial relationship to a defendant's opportunity better to defend
himself at trial, that kind of inquiry is not before us in this
case.15 8
Clearly the Louisiana statute envisions that a child will give a complete
account of the substance of the criminal charges which will bring it
squarely within the constitutional determination reserved in Stincer. The
statute will ,withstand constitutional scrutiny if and only if the combi-
nation of its particular features 9 are sufficient to overcome the denial
of the right of the defendant and his counsel to be present during the
taping session.
First, unlike the competency hearing under review in Stincer, the
optimal time for scheduling the videotaping session will be shortly after
the commission of the alleged offense, when no charging decision may
have yet been made concerning a particular defendant. At least histor-
ically, the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel (and presumably con-
frontation as well) does not attach until the onset of adversary judicial
155. Id. at 4904 n.17.
156. Id. at 4903.
157. Id. at 4905.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Rather obviously, the legislature's general acknowledgment of the defendant's
confrontation rights offers little protection. If the defendant has a constitutional right to
be present and cross-examine at the videotaping session, then the statute is gutted. The
interpretational admonition that "[nlothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit
the defendant's right of confrontation" would become useless. La. R.S. 15:440.5 (Supp.
1987).
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criminal proceedings. 160 Second, even if the videotaping session occurs
after indictment or accusation, it is purposefully and explicitly a non-
adversarial process. Not only is the defense excluded but so also are
the prosecution and any relatives of the child victim who potentially at
least might exert an influence over the child. The presence of a neutral
supervisor is required to monitor and insure the detachment of the
process from the usual sorts of partisan examination.
From the interrelationship of timing and neutrality of the process,
we derive the central notion that an early videotaping of a child witness's
statement can produce a more reliable testimonial account than is oth-
erwise achievable through the ordinary processes of examination and
cross-examination. If, as this article has attempted to document, this
premise is true, then it is difficult to understand how the defendant is
harmed in fact. As it has been construed, the Confrontation Clause
ordinarily includes the right of cross-examination.1 61 However, in the
case of child witnesses, if it is provable that an adversarial process at
the early stages of a child's outcry diminishes rather than secures re-
liability, then surely an exception could be justified. The Constitution
.ought not to be interpreted to permit a defendant to use it as a shield
against the production of more reliable evidence about the accusation
against him.
The third feature of the Louisiana videotaping statute which might
spare it from a ruling of unconstitutionality is that it creates a new
discovery right for an accused. 162 Using the cost-benefit analysis of recent
Supreme Court precedent, 63 it is important to underscore the fact that
as a direct result of the use of videotaping procedure, the defendant
receives an important benefit which would not otherwise be his: the
right to have a copy of the videotaped statement of the individual who
will undoubtedly become the prosecution's principal witness at trial.
Under the general provisions of Louisiana law, a defendant does not
have the right to interview or depose a prosecution witness before trial.164
As to the other factors enumerated in Stincer, the Louisiana statute
would appear constitutionally sufficient. The child will subsequently
appear and testify in open court, if called by either party, and will be
subject to a full and complete cross-examination at trial. More impor-
160. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877 (1972).
161. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965).
162. This new right is discussed infra at notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
164. Article 723 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure states: "[Tihis chapter
does not authorize the discovery . . . of statements made by witnesses or prospective
witnesses, other than the defendant, to the district attorney, or to agents of the state."
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tantly, unlike the competency procedure before the Court in Stincer,
the defendant will have a record of the prior statement to use for the
preparation and conduct of his cross-examination. According to the
Louisiana statute, the videotape is not admissible unless both the child
and his interviewer, if any, are also "available to testify" at trial; 65
and the defendant must be permitted pre-trial review of any videotape. 66
The timing of the assessment of compliance with a defendant's
confrontation rights makes all the difference. Viewed from a point in
time immediately after the creation of the videotaped evidence, the
exclusion of the accused and counsel from that process might then
appear to be a denial of confrontation. However, in the interim between
the videotaping and trial, the defendant is given access to the recording
which enables him to prepare any objections to its admissibility and
prepare his defense to the child's recorded assertions. At trial, the
availability of the child and any interviewer for any necessary cross-
examination seems to provide adequate protection of the defendant's
right of confrontation.
The argument that postponed or non-simultaneous cross-examination
somehow violates the Confrontation Clause 67 appears to have been
finally put to rest in the Stincer case. As the dissenters characterize the
majority opinion: "The Court today defines respondent's Sixth Amend-
ment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him as guar-
anteeing nothing more than an opportunity to cross-examine these
witnesses at some point during the trial."' 68 However, in defense of the
majority's position, it must be noted that the Supreme Court has never
yet found a violation of the Confrontation Clause in situations where
a witness concedes having made recorded statements and is subject to
full cross-examination at trial. In each of the seven Supreme Court cases
which address this issue, the declarant was not available for full cross-
examination about his prior statements at a later trial. 69
165. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(6) and (8) (Supp. 1987).
166. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(7) (Supp. 1987).
167. See Tulane Comment, supra note 8, at 166-80. The basis for the argument that
postponing confrontation and cross-examination until trial is unconstitutional stems from
concern voiced by the Supreme Court in California v. Green, wherein the Court observed:
The main danger in substituting subsequent for timely cross-examination seems
to lie in the possibility that the witness' "[flalse testimony is apt to harden and
become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has
opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestion of others ....
399 U.S. 149, 159, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1935 (1970) (quoting an earlier Minnesota decision,
State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939)).
168. Stincer, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4905 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
169. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965), the victim was unavailable
and the state sought to introduce prior testimony at a preliminary hearing at which the
19871
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Furthermore, insofar as the due process challenge is concerned, the
Stincer majority takes a functional view of the right of cross-examination,
placing the burden squarely upon the defendant to demonstrate how his
presence at the earlier hearing would have enhanced the reliability of
the procedure:' 0
Respondent has given no indication that his presence at the
competency hearing in this case would have been useful in
ensuring a more reliable determination as to whether the wit-
nesses were competent to testify. He has presented no evidence
that his relationship with the children, or his knowledge of facts
regarding their background, could have assisted either his counsel
or the judge in asking questions that would have resulted in a
more assured determination of competency. 17'
2. "Availability" of the Child as a Witness
Much has been made of the fact that under the Louisiana statute
the prosecution may elect not to present the child victim as a witness,
relying instead upon the probity of the videotaped statement. 7 2 In con-
stitutional terms, it is argued that forcing the accused to call the child
defendant was unrepresented. The Court found a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074 (1965), an accomplice refused to
testify at trial and the state sought to introduce police officer's testimony about a confession
by the accomplice which incriminated the defendant. The Court found a violation of the
Confrontation Clause. In Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318 (1968), the witness
was inexplicably not present at trial, and the state sought to introduce his prior testimony
at a preliminary hearing. The Court found a violation of the Confrontation Clause. In
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968), a co-defendant was not
offered for testimony, and the state sought simply to introduce his confession which
incriminated the defendant. The Court found a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
In Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, the witness claimed a lapse of memory, and
the state sought to introduce prior testimony at a preliminary hearing. No violation of
the Confrontation Clause resulted. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S. Ct. 2531
(1980), the witness failed to appear at trial, and, in rebuttal to a defense claim about
her probable testimony, the state offered her prior testimony at a preliminary hearing.
No violation of the Confrontation Clause resulted. In Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,
105 S. Ct. 2078 (1985), the state offered an accomplice's confession as rebuttal to a
defense claim that he had been compelled to model his own confession on the prior one
given by the accomplice. Although the accomplice did not testify, the sheriff did. No
violation of the Confrontation Clause was found.
170. Consequently, Stincer falls in line with other Sixth Amendment right to counsel
precedent, such as Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 182, 92 S. Ct. 1877 (1972), and Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972).
171. Stincer, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4905.
172. Tulane Comment, supra note 8, at 179-80. For a discussion of this option under
the Louisiana statute, see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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as an adverse witness compels him to elect between two guarantees: the
right of confrontation and the "right to remain passive,"' 73 that is, the
right to make the state entirely shoulder the burden of proof.'1 4
This argument was accepted in a recent Texas Court of Appeal
decision, Long v. State. 75 Long might well be dismissed as simply an
aberrant ruling 76 were it not for the fact that it may have already
influenced the course of Louisiana jurisprudence. 77 The most incredible
part of the Texas opinion in Long is the following passage:
[N]either our record nor the legislative history contains evi-
dence that the child was, or that sex-abuse victims generally are,
emotionally disturbed, reluctant to testify, or intimidated by the
accused, or evidence that the videotape procedure was more
likely than in-court testimony to elicit a reliable response.""
Certainly, as a general proposition, there is overwhelming documentation
available that child abuse victims are emotionally disturbed by in-court
reiteration of their ordeal, and that an early, videotaped account is
more reliable than later testimony. 79 However, the court's ignorance
may be due to the fact that such data was not preserved in the legislative
history of the Texas statute nor argued before the court in defense of
the legislation.
173. Tulane Comment, supra note 8, at 179.
174. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S. Ct. 967 (1968), the Court
held that a forced choice between two fundamental constitutional rights is forbidden by
due process. The procedure invalidated in Simmons permitted the government's use at
trial (in violation of Fifth Amendment rights) of the defendant's prior suppression hearing
testimony in support of his Fourth Amendment rights. This issue is raised in the context
of videotaping statutes by the dissenters in Stincer, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4907 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
175. 694 S.W. 2d 185 (Tex. App. 5 dist. 1985).
176. First of all, the Texas court interpreted the Confrontation Clause to require either
a deposition or that the child witness reiterate the former statement as direct testimony
for the state, despite the more limited rights acknowledged by the United States Supreme
court as previously discussed. See supra notes 160 and 161 and accompanying text.
Secondly, even though the child witness was available at trial, the court imposed the duty
upon the state, as the proponent of the statement, to demonstrate that there was sufficient
indicia of reliability to justify admitting the prior videotaped statement. As several com-
mentaries point out, the state's burden of proving indicia of reliability of the hearsay
declaration has been imposed only when the declarant is unavailable for later testimony
at trial. See Comment, Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev.
1745 (1983).
177. See State v. R.C., Jr., 494 So. 2d 1350, 1355, which cites Long and in dictum
notes that the Louisiana statutory scheme "severely compromises the defendant's consti-
tutional rights." Id. at 1356.
178. Long, 694 S.W.2d 185.
179. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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A similar failure of proof occurred in State v. R.C., Jr.80 before
the Second Circuit Court of Appeal of Louisiana. At stake was the
proper interpretation of the statute's requirement that "[tihe child must
be available to testify.""'' In this case, a videotaped recording had been
made, and the five-year-old victim answered a few questions on direct.
Then, the child lapsed into muteness when defense counsel sought to
conduct a cross-examination. When asked whether she was going to
answer any of the defense counsel's questions, the child shook her head
negatively. Defense counsel argued that the victim was "unavailable"
and, therefore, the statutory requirements for the videotape's admissi-
bility had not been satisfied. In an opinion which carefully avoided the
constitutional issue, though its lengthy discussion of Long and other
Texas precedent is disturbing, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's ruling that the videotape was inadmissible due to the child's
'unavailability".
The Court of Appeal seems to have arrived at the correct result in
R.C., Jr. When the defendant is denied the right of cross-examination
during the making of the videotape and is precluded from effective
cross-examination due to the child's intransigence at trial, a strong
argument can be made that his fundamental rights to a fair trial and
to confront his accuser have been violated. 8 2 Nevertheless, even if no
constitutional infringement occurs when a child witness refuses to respond
to cross-examination,' the clear requirement of "availability" under
the Louisiana statute remains unmet.
180. 494 So. 2d 1350 (La. App. 2d 1986).
181. It should be noted that the Louisiana legislature did not clearly articulate whether
a child victim must be subject to cross-examination by the defendant. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(6)
(Supp. 1987) explicitly provides that "[tihe person conducting the interview of the child
in the recording [must be] present at the proceeding and available to testify or be cross-
examined by either party." However, Subsection (A)(8), the parallel provision concerning
the child victim, says simply: "The child [must be] available to testify."
182. A similar ruling was made in a Texas case, Gibson v. State, No. A14-86-409CR
(Ct. App. 14th Dist., April 16, 1987). There, after a finding of competency, a four-year-
old refused to testify as to any particulars of the alleged abuse and even denied she was
sexually abused. The state then attempted to introduce a videotape of a prior statement
made by the child. The court held that the statutory requirement of "availability" means
that the witness must be willing and able to testify.
183. Arguably, even in cases of witness unavailability, the Constitution does not
foreclose the state from using the witness's prior hearsay statements. According to Supreme
Court precedent, the state is permitted to make a showing in such cases that the prior
recorded statement is trustworthy and its receipt "necessary" because unavailable from
other sources.
As the Supreme Court stated in California v. Green:
As in the case where the witness is physically unproducible, the State here has




Before the videotape can be admitted into evidence, the defendant
or his attorney must be "afforded an opportunity to view the recording.
. ". 4 The Louisiana statute makes no provision, however, for the
defendant's previewing of any tape which the prosecution does not intend
to offer into evidence. Such a situation is quite likely to occur.
Suppose, for example, that the District Attorney is sufficiently im-
pressed with a child's story of his victimization that the decision to
prepare a case is made. The first step is to make a videotape of an
interview with the child. However, during the taped interview, the child
becomes elusive, the equivocal in his memory of certain details of the
assault. In the extreme case, the child recants his identification of the
accused adult, although in this instance other evidence exists which seems
to establish the defendant's culpability, such as, the testimony of another
witness, the defendant's confession, or circumstantial evidence connecting
the defendant to this offense. Because the District Attorney would
undoubtedly elect not to use the child's videotaped statement at trial,
there would be no clear requirement under the current statute to alert
the defendant to the statement's existence, much less afford him the
opportunity to view it.
The question which arises under such a foreseeable scenario'85 is
whether the defendant's due process rights to exculpatory evidence are
violated by the failure of the videotaping statute to anticipate and
affirmatively acknowledge those rights? The authors submit that Loui-
siana Revised Statute 15:440.5(A)(7) need not specifically address this
issue so long as the general rules of pre-trial discovery are amended to
include access to videotapes and to reflect current requirements of federal
witness .... Whether [the witness] then testified in a manner consistent or
inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, claimed a loss of memory,
claimed his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or simply refused to
answer, nothing in the Confrontation Clause prohibited the State from also
relying on his prior testimony to prove its case against [the accused].
399 U.S. 149, 167-68, 90 S. Ct. 1939-40 (1970).
184. La. R.S. 15:440.5(A)(7) (Supp. 1987).
185. A second foreseeable fact pattern is illustrated by Woods v. State, 713 S.W.2d
173 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986). There two videotapes were made of the child's account.
In the first, the victim denied that anyone had assaulted her, maintaining instead that
her injuries were the result of a fall. Two months later, in the second videotape, the
child described the assault and identified the defendant as the perpetrator. Only this
second videotape was presented to the defendant. Upon learning of the prior videotape,
the defendants moved for a new trial claiming that the state had wrongfully withheld
exculpatory evidence. Rather narrowly construing the Brady command, the Texas court
held that while arguably the first tape was exculpatory, taken as a whole, its admission
would not have changed the outcome of the case.
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constitutional law. However, for purposes of clarifying the defendant's
discovery rights to this new type of evidence, certainly the better course
might be to include an affirmative right of access to exculpatory vi-
deotaped statements within this statute or at least to provide an explicit
cross-reference to the general discovery rules.
Article 718 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that:
[O]n motion of the defendant, the court shall order the district
attorney to permit or authorize the defendant to inspect, copy,
examine .... photograph, or otherwise reproduce books, papers,
documents, photographs, tangible objects, ... or copies or por-
tions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or con-
trol of the state and which: ... are favorable to the defendant
and which are material and relevant to the issue of guilt or
punishment.... 116
Note that this requirement is not limited to evidence that the District
Attorney intends to offer at trial. Hence, even in the situation described
in the above hypothetical, the defendant under this general discovery
right might well be entitled to inspect the videotape.
When enacted, article 718 adequately reflected the state of federal
constitutional law as it had been laid down by the Supreme Court in
Brady v. Maryland.8 7 Brady seemed to impose a duty of disclosure of
exculpatory material upon the prosecutor only upon a request by the
defendant. However, since Brady, the Supreme Court has decided United
States v. Bagley, 8 ' holding that the Brady duty of disclosure is operative
even in absence of any request for exculpatory evidence by the accused."8 9
Consequently, article 718 needs to be amended to reflect this important
procedural change.
186. La. Code of Crim. P. art. 718.
187. 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). The Supreme Court held that the suppression
by the prosecution of 'evidence favorable to the accused, upon request by the defendant,
violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment.
188. 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985). According to Bagley, evidence is "material"
only if there is a reasonable probability that either the guilt determination or the punishment
imposed would have been affected had the defendant been given pre-trial access. Id. at
682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3384. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984), the Court had previously defined "reasonable probability" as a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.
189. The materiality standard is "sufficiently flexible to cover the 'no request', 'general
request', and 'specific request' cases for failure to disclose evidence favorable to the
accused." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S. Ct. at 3384. As a result, the standard of
materiality of Brady no longer depends on the degree of specificity of the defendant's
request for exculpatory material or indeed the lack of any such request by the accused.
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Deciding when particular evidence must be shared with the defendant
will always present close questions of due process and ethical respon-
sibility for prosecutors and reviewing courts, no less so when videotaped.
statements of child victims are the source of dispute. What is the
prosecutor's burden (or the defendant's right) when, for example, the
child's videotape reveals some detail confusion, identification ambiguity,
or immaterial, though provable inaccuracy of memory? While arguably
not "exculpatory" in the ultimate sense of Brady, the videotape might
well provide an accused with important impeachment evidence. 19° In
Bagley, the Supreme Court expressly held that "Impeachment evidence
* .. as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule."' 91
In support of the Louisiana position that the defendant be supplied
with the videotape only if the child is to testify at trial, others have
argued that the child cannot be otherwise protected from the rigors of
defense harassment. As the authors of one influential book reason:
[C]hildren's interviews are seldom straightforward, and the
child may volunteer information that is detrimental to the case
and cannot be excised. For example, we viewed a videotape of
a three-year old who wavered on the question of whether she
had a dog. An astute defense attorney could exploit the child's
statement. Indeed, the child may even deny the allegation at
the time the videotape is made. 92
There is, however, little extant data which would suggest an inability
of jurors or the bench to ignore immaterial fact confusion, such as
whether the child actually possesses a dog. 193 Furthermore, the court has
a duty to protect any witness, especially a child, from harassment, 94
and there is no empirical data which would suggest courts' failure to
provide protection. If anything, defense counsel probably conducts a
190. The due process right and right of confrontation are interrelated. In Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974), the defendant was denied the right under
the state's confidentiality statute to question a prosecution witness about his juvenile court
record. The Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause had been violated because
the defendant was denied the right "to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors
... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Id. at
318, 94 S. Ct. 1105, at 1111.
191. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375.
192. Whitcomb, supra note 97, at 138.
193. Goodman, Golding & Haith, Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, 40 J. Soc.
Issues 139 (1984).
194. La. R.S. 15:275 (1981) provides: "In the discipline of his court, the trial judge
is vested with a sound discretion to stop the prolonged, unnecessary and irrelevant
examination of a witness, whether such examination be direct or cross, and even though
no objection be urged by counsel."
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grueling cross-examination of a child at the defendant's peril. 195 But of
paramount importance is the fact that the potential for unreliability is
simply too great to deny the defense every opportunity to prepare a
meaningful cross-examination of the child.
In sum, although providing a defendant access to any videotaped
statement, regardless of whether the prosecution intends to introduce it
at trial, may not be constitutionally compelled, we submit that the
legislature should take this step. 196
V. REFORM PROPOSALS
The experience with videotaping statutes in Louisiana and other
jurisdictions has provided us with a much better grasp of the predictable
problems which arise in its administration. Because of the jurisprudence
which has accumulated in the interim and particularly because of Rule
807 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, we are now in a better position
to improve the basic statute so that both the minimization of trauma
and the 'enhancement of reliability can be achieved.
Based upon the discussion of this article, we submit the following
proposed statute:
440.1 Purpose
It is declared to be in the best interest of the state to provide for
the early recordation of the statement of a child witness or victim's
testimony in order to promote testimonial reliability and to minimize
the infliction of additional, unnecessary emotional or psychological harm
upon the child.
440.2 Definitions
As used in this Subpart, these terms are defined as follows:
195. As one author noted:
A juror [Monique Weiner] on a child molestation case in Los Angeles [in 19851
said that at times in a deputy public defender's cross-examination of a 9-year-
old girl, she hoped the lawyer's children would be molested so he could see a
defense lawyer doing to them what he was doing to the witness .... The jury
convicted. . . . Defense attorney [Barry] Plotkin says his experience in [defending
child molestation cases] has taught him that when it comes to children, the
defense lawyer must restrain his drive to destroy a witness. "You have to be
very careful with a kid," he says. "You press to a point and then you quit
while you're ahead. If you press too far, suddenly 12 angry pairs of eyes are
focused on you, wanting to know why you're riding rough-shod over the child."
Girdner, supra note 7, at 89.
196. Although prosecutors might predictably be opposed to such an extension, in view
of the data which suggests that viewing videotaped statements encourages guilty pleas,




(1) Any person under the age of 14 who has been the direct
victim of abuse or has been an eyewitness to such abuse per-
petrated upon another person, or who is a witness to an act of
violence directed at himself or another person,
(2) Any person under the age of 18 whomthe court finds
will suffer severe emotional or psychological harm if not afforded
the special protections of this Act.
B. "Videotape" means any visual recording produced by elec-
tronic means together with its associated oral record.
C. "Abuse" means the infliction or attempted infliction of
physical, mental, or emotional injury, prohibited sexual contact
or sexual exploitation, including threats of such action which
seriously endanger the physical, mental, or emotional health of
the victim.
D. "Circumstantial indicia of reliability" includes the following:
(1) the age of the child;
(2) the child's physical and mental condition;
(3) the circumstances of the alleged event;
(4) the language used by the child;
(5) the existence, if any, of corroborative evidence;
(6) the existence of any apparent motive to falsify;
(7) the existence of any coercion, inducement, or undue in-
fluence given the child to make a particular statement, at or
before the time of the statement;
(8) the time when the statement was made, including the
interval between the alleged event and the recording of the child's
recollection;
(9) the number of interviews of the child prior to the recording;
(10) any variations or retractions of the recorded account
which have occurred before trial.
440.3 Authorization
A. Any court may, on its own motion or on the motion of the
district attorney, a parish welfare unit or agency, law enforcement per-
sonnel, the legal representative of the child, or any party to the pro-
ceedings, require that a statement of a child be recorded on videotape.
B. There shall be a presumption of severe emotional or psychological
harm when the child witness has himself been the victim of abuse, an
eyewitness to such abuse perpetrated against another individual, or an
eyewitness to any event of physical violence.
C. Upon a showing that there is a substantial likelihood that a child
witness under the age of eighteen will suffer severe emotional or psy-
chological harm, the court may require such a recording when the child
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has himself been the victim of abuse, an eyewitness to such abuse
perpetrated against another individual, or any eyewitness to any event
of physical violence. In ruling on such a claim, the court may receive
expert testimony about the potential for such harm for the particular
child.
440.4 Method of making a qualifying videotape
A. A videotaped statement of a child which meets the requirements
of this Subpart qualifies for admission into evidence in addition to or
in lieu of the child's direct testimony.
B. The child may be interviewed by a physician, a board-certified
social worker, or any other specially trained individual authorized to
conduct such interviews by the Department of Health and Human Re-
sources although the interviewer may not through his own statements
or questions mislead the child to make any particular statement material
to the child's recollection of the witnessed events.
C. The taking of the child's statement must be supervised by a
physician, a board-certified social worker, or any other specially trained
individual authorized to conduct such interviews by the Department of
Health and Human Resources.
D. No one except the child, an interviewer, the supervisor of the
interview, if not the interviewer, and the operator of the videotaping
equipment may be present in the room in which the child's statement
is made.
E. The resulting recording must:
1. Identify every person who is present in the room during
the taking of the child's statement and state his role and au-
thorization;
2. Identify the voice of every person who speaks on the
videotape; and
3. Show an exchange and discussion with the child before
beginning to make any statement that he understands the im-
portance of a truthful statement and accepts the responsibility
for giving an accurate account of his recollections. A formal
oath may be required of the child, if such would contribute to
the child's understanding of his obligations.
F. The Department of Health and Human Resources shall develop
and promulgate regulations regarding training requirements for and cert-
ification of any individual authorized to conduct or supervise the taking
of a child's statement.
440.5 Rights of a defendant
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When the statement of a child witness in a criminal prosecution is
taken pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the defendant is entitled
to:
A. Be provided with and to examine a copy of the resulting videotape
or videotapes, regardless of whether the prosecution intends to introduce
any at trial, at least ten days before trial; and
B. Have the opportunity to summon and to fully cross-examine at
trial any person who participated in the preparation of the videotaped
interview, including the child, about the contents of the videotaped
statement.
440.6 Admissibility
A. A videotape may be admitted into evidence at the trial of any
matter without further proof of the child's competency as a witness, if
the court, after viewing it and hearing cross-examination, if any, finds:
1. That the videotape meets the requirements of 440.4;
2. That the recorded statement of the child is the product of
his own recollection and was not distorted in any material way
as a result of any influence practiced by the interviewer or any
other party who was present during its taking;
3. That the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
otherwise provide sufficient circumstantial indicia of reliability;
4. That the resulting videotape was mechanically accurate and
has not been edited or altered since the time of its recording;
and
B. Any videotape admitted under this Act may constitute the entire
direct evidence from the child. However, nothing herein shall preclude
the proponent from calling the child as a witness to give testimony or
from taking the child's testimony outside the courtroom as authorized
in R.S. 15:283. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the
defendant from calling the child. for cross-examination.
440.7 Confidentiality
Any videotape taken pursuant to the provisions of this Act becomes
a part of the court record and shall be preserved under a protective
order of the court to protect the privacy of the parties to the action.
The court shall order the destruction of the videotape after five years
have elapsed from the date of final judgment or after a final judgment
on appeal.
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